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CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
1.1 Introduction 
Executive remuneration has become one of the key issues in corporate governance1 and it 
is regarded as an important topic as it provides a classic illustration of the agency problem 
that arises in the corporate governance debate.2 The agency problem essentially arises 
where there is a divergence of goals by company directors (the agents) who are hired to 
take risks and decisions that will raise the capital invested in the company by the 
shareholders (the principals).3 In relation to executive remuneration the agency problem 
arises where the executives shirk their responsibilities and take risks and decisions which 
are aimed at increasing their own remuneration to the detriment of the profit attributable to 
the shareholders.4 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an 
international organization that brings together the governments of countries committed to 
democracy and the market economy to support sustainable economic growth, boost 
employment, raise living standards, maintain financial stability, assist other countries’ 
economic development, and contribute to growth in world trade, expressed the agency 
problem in the following extract; 
‘What makes corporate governance necessary? Put simply, the interests of those 
who have effective control over a firm can differ from the interests of those who 
supply the firm with external finance. The problem, commonly referred to as a 
principal-agent problem, grows out of the separation of ownership and control 
and of corporate outsiders and insiders. In the absence of the protections that 
good governance supplies, asymmetries of information and difficulties of 
monitoring results in capital providers, who lack control over the corporation, 
finding it risky and costly to protect themselves from the opportunistic behaviour 
of managers and controlling shareholders.’5 
                                                  
1 JG Hill ‘Regulating Executive Remuneration: International Developments in the Post Scandal 
Era’   (2006) 3 ECL 64 at 64. 
2 K Massie et al Executive Salaries in South Africa: Who Should Have Say on Pay? 1ed (2014) 54. 
  3 S Blanche et al ‘Separation of Ownership and Control in South African-Listed Companies’ (2013) 
16 SAJEMS 316 at 320. 
4 Ibid. 
5 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, (OECD, April 1999) available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf, accessed on 3 August 2014. 
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Executive remuneration became one of the prominently featured corporate 
governance issues globally after the collapse of many international corporations6 like 
Enron, for example. Despite the Enron collapse being predominantly caused by serious 
accounting or financial reporting irregularities,7 reports conducted by the US Senate8 found 
that there were some key areas where the board had failed in its duties to the company, in 
particular, in its fiduciary duties and the duty to avoid conflict of interest. Excessive 
director compensation was also found to be one of the key areas where the board had failed 
in its duties because the board had failed to monitor cumulative cash drain and abuses by 
the Board chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The Report also disclosed that in 
2000 Enron’s CEO, Kenneth Lay, earned a total compensation which exceeded US$ 140 
million, including US$ 123 million in exercising stock options. After the company’s 
collapse, it was further discovered that Enron paid its executives large performance-based 
bonuses in 2001, based upon their success in achieving certain stock price targets. It was 
later discovered that these targets had been reached through massive account manipulation. 
The Enron case shed light on how the Board, its chairman and executives can use their 
position of power to control the company to the detriment of the shareholders. 
The 2008 financial crisis further fuelled more interest on executive remuneration as 
a corporate governance issue and the need for better regulation because although executive 
remuneration did not have a direct impact on the financial crisis, it was the flaws that 
existed in the remuneration practices in the investment banking sector that played a role in 
promoting the accumulation of risks that lead to the crisis.9 For example, the bonus driven 
remuneration structures encouraged reckless or excessive risk taking which were not 
aligned with shareholder interest nor long term sustainability of banks.10  
In South Africa the need to address the issue of executive remuneration has been 
largely influenced by the agency problem coupled with the above-mentioned international 
developments. Additionally, public outrage towards directors who continue to pay 
                                                  
6 Hill op cit (n1) 64. 
7 Ibid. 
8 US Senate Report Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental 
Affairs of the United States Senate “The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron’s Collapse” (2002). 
9 E De Jongh et al ‘A review of operational risk in banks and its role in the financial crisis’ (2013) 16 
SAJEMS 364 at 368. 
10 Ibid. 
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themselves more despite the large income disparities between the executives and the 
average workers led to more interest on the issue.11 The reality of the problems associated 
with income inequality in the country have been compelling given the high levels of crime, 
violence and strikes that have swept the country in recent years. The 2012 Lonmin platinum 
mine strike in Marikana provides a classic example of the problems associated with the 
income disparity problem. The strike was essentially a dispute about remuneration and 
living conditions of the mine workers. Whilst the mine workers were demanding an income 
increase from about R4000 to R12 500 per month, company reports, on the other hand, 
showed that former Lonmin CEO, Ian Farmer, earned an alarming R24-million.12 
According to the Labour Research Service the 2011 wage gap between the CEO and the 
average worker in the mining industry was 390 to 1 which meant that an average worker 
would have to work 325 years to earn the value of the CEO’s remuneration in 2011.13 These 
large income disparities emphasize the importance of having strong regulatory and 
enforcement mechanisms that promote fair and responsible remuneration policies. 
1.2  Problem Statement 
Executive remuneration when in excess, also known as ‘fat cake packages’,14 has negative 
effects because it erodes company capital and dividend return to shareholders which 
subsequently leads to employment cut backs, strikes, crime and other negative effects on a 
country as a whole. Therefore, regulating executive remuneration is important for curbing 
these adverse effects and enhancing the principles of good corporate governance. Different 
ways have over the years been employed to address the issue of excessive executive pay 
and these have included: ensuring proper disclosure, appointment of remuneration 
committees comprising of independent persons who are tasked with determining executive 
pay packages, packages that link pay to performance in an attempt to align the interest of 
                                                  
11 HE Scholtz ‘Executive remuneration and company performance for South African companies     
listed on the Alternative Exchange (AltX)’ (2012) 16 SABR 22 at 23. 
12 C Molefe et al ‘National Pay Disparity Blamed for Mine Unrest’ Mail Guardian, 14 September 
2012, available at http://mg.co.za/article/2012-09-14-00-pay-disparity-blamed-for-unrest, accessed 
16 August 2014. 
13 M Taal et al ‘A Mineworker’s Wage: The only argument against the R12 500 is greed.’ Labour 
Research Service, 28 August 2012, available at 
www.lrs.org.za/docs/A%20Mineworkers%20Wage.pdf, accessed 16th August 2014. 
14 JEO Abugu ‘Monitoring directors’ remuneration, fat cat packages and perks of office’ (2011) 19 
J.F.C 6. 
 4 
 
the manager and executive with those of the shareholders, and giving shareholders a vote 
on the matter.15 Despite these methods there is still an ever increasing gap between the 
levels of executive remuneration and the remuneration of the average South African worker 
which consequently results in vast unequal income distribution and many social ills like 
crime within the country.  
Research done by Professor Murray Leibbrandt and others in 2010 on income 
inequality revealed that between 1993 and 2008 South Africa’s Gini coefficient – a 
measure of inequality where zero indicates perfect equality and 1 the highest level of 
inequality –had increased from 0.66 to 0.70.16 Additionally, the research revealed that 
South Africa had a very high Gini coefficient even when compared with other high-scoring 
countries like Chile, Mexico and Turkey.17  
This information raises the question; is South Africa doing enough to regulate 
executive pay and curb the adverse effects of excessive pay or does more need to be done? 
By embarking on an evaluative analysis of the current regulatory frameworks in South 
Africa and comparing them with those of developed jurisdictions, the question above is 
answered. Furthermore, suggestions for improvement are developed where the evaluative 
analysis reveals that South Africa is not doing enough. 
1.3 Background  
Corporate governance in its simplest form is defined as ‘the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled’.18 Its main objective is to address the agency problem that 
arises in company law where the owners who are not in control have to rely on the board 
of directors to govern their company competently and in their best interests.19 Corporate 
governance addresses this problem by setting out best practice and principles that are aimed 
at ensuring that directors discharge their duties, namely the duty of care, skill, diligence 
and fiduciary duties, in a manner that is characterised by the governance principles of 
fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency.20 The board of directors, referred 
                                                  
15 S Luiz ‘’Executive Remuneration and Shareholder Voting’’ (2013) 25 SA MERC LJ 267 at 269. 
16 Massie op cit (n2) xxii. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report) (1992), available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf, accessed 16 August 2014 at 14. 
19 C Kneale Corporate Governance in Southern Africa 1ed (2012) 14. 
20 FHI Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 403. 
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to as the epicentre of a company, are responsible for managing the affairs of the company 
and taking vital decisions relating to the running of the company. The individual directors, 
in particular, hold positions of trust and are accordingly expected to act as such.21 They 
owe fiduciary duties to the company and are expected to act in utmost good faith in all their 
dealings with, for, and on behalf of the company, to be loyal to the company and to avoid 
conduct that amounts to conflict of interest and duty.22  
Millet LJ in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew23 summarized the director’s 
fiduciaries duties as follows: 
‘The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The 
principle is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core 
liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make 
a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty 
and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of 
a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is not intended 
to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary 
obligations. They are the defining characteristics of the fiduciary.’  
It is to this end that executive directors in the discharge of their duties are expected 
to take risks and decisions which are aimed at boosting short and long-term company 
performance.24 However, they are not expected, as fiduciaries charged with a vast amount 
of responsibility, to take risks and decisions that are self-serving or those which may cause 
them to manage the company in a manner that increases their remuneration to the detriment 
of the profit attributable to the shareholders.25 This is because director’s remuneration is a 
company expense, which directly influences the determination of profit attributable to the 
shareholders.26 
When directors deviate from their responsibilities and take risks and decisions which 
increase their salaries as opposed to increasing company capital and dividend return to 
shareholders, concerns over director remuneration are raised, particularly when it is 
excessive. These concerns over high levels of remuneration are justified for a number of 
                                                  
21 Abugu op cit (n14) 6. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew 1996 4 ALL ER 698 (CA) 711. 
24 Kneale op cit (n19) 15. 
25 Blanche op cit (n3) 319. 
26 Ibid. 
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reasons including that: - (1) High levels of remuneration go against the principles of good 
corporate governance. In particular they go against the corporate governance principles 
requiring executive remuneration to be fair and responsible, to be linked to individual 
performance and that remuneration policies be in the best interests of the company.27 (2) 
High remuneration also goes against the director’s duties owed to the company, namely the 
fiduciary duties and duty to avoid conflict of interest. (3) Excessive director remuneration 
has damaging effects on the stock market, as it deters private investors because they will 
be reluctant to invest in companies that reward their leaders far more than they deserve 
especially when the company is performing badly.28  (4) Excessive remuneration stirs 
public outrage particularly when the gap between the levels of executive remuneration and 
the remuneration of the average worker is growing yearly.29 (5) As an agency problem 
concerns over executive remuneration are raised on the grounds that it enables the directors 
to take advantage of their position of power to control the company to the detriment of the 
shareholders who own it.30  
As a means of achieving good corporate governance by ensuring that directors are 
held accountable, and restricting their ability to remunerate themselves excessively, it is 
important that director’s remuneration is adequately regulated. Adequate regulation is vital 
as it promotes better adherence with the corporate governance principles and the 
legislatively protected director’s fiduciary duties. This subsequently results in having 
boards, directors and in general companies which are more accountable, transparent, 
responsible and fair, the principles underlying the very essence of corporate governance.31 
South Africa has significantly strengthened its corporate governance regulatory 
framework by reforming its corporate laws through the amendments and improvements 
made to the Companies Act 71 of 2008, King III and Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
Listings Requirements. These legal and regulatory instruments have been influential in 
regulating the way in which directors are remunerated as a way of achieving good corporate 
governance and compliance with the law. For example, under the Companies Act 61 of 
                                                  
27 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2009 Chapter 2 (hereinafter referred to 
as King III).  
28 Kneale op cit (n19) 176. 
29 Luiz op cit (n15) 293. 
30 Blanche op cit (n3) 319. 
31 S Kopel Guide to Business Law 5ed (2009) 440. 
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1973 the shareholders through Annual General Meetings (AGM) had the power to from 
time to time determine the remuneration of directors.32  The Act, however, did not make it 
an offence to not hold AGMs and in many cases director remuneration was decided based 
on the guides stipulated in the articles and memorandum, which guides had no binding 
effect.33 This therefore meant that directors’ remuneration was easily open to abuse by the 
directors because they could use their power and position to give themselves high salaries. 
An improvement was made under the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 because it 
specifically, under s 66(9), requires a special resolution approved by the shareholders 
within the previous two years, for director’s remuneration to be paid. This condition 
requiring a special resolution means that the shareholders are mandated to approve the 
payment of remuneration and where they have not the directors will not be entitled to 
receive such remuneration. This is important as it curtails abuse of power and excessive 
remuneration.34 
1.4  Research Objective 
The purpose of this dissertation is thus to evaluate the extent to which the existing legal 
and regulatory instruments in South Africa have effectively regulated director’s 
remuneration as a means of ensuring that those in control are accountable to the owners 
and  do not remunerate themselves excessively with the owners’ money. The research will 
embark on a comparative analysis with international jurisdictions being Australia and the 
United Kingdom with the objective of determining how these countries have regulated 
executive director remuneration and the lessons that South Africa can learn from them. 
Lastly, the research will provide recommendations on how the existing frameworks can be 
improved to ensure adequate and effective regulation of executive director remuneration. 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
32 Article 54 of Table A and Article 55 Table B Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
33 N Schoeman ‘Directors Remuneration: The new Companies Act of 2008’, available at 
https://www.findanattorney.co.za/content_directors-remuneration, accessed 12 August 2014. 
34 Cassim op cit (n20) 455. 
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1.5  Methodology and Outcomes 
1.5.1  Research questions 
The main question that the research will endeavour to answer is: Is South Africa doing 
enough, in terms of its legislative governance (ie Companies Act 71 of 2008) and 
regulatory codes of best practice such as the JSE Listings Requirements and King III, to 
regulate executive director remuneration? The above question gives rise to a number of 
sub-questions which will be answered in the dissertation. The sub-questions are as follows: 
(a) What is good corporate governance and why is it important? 
(b) Why has executive director remuneration become an important corporate 
governance issue in South Africa? 
(c) How is South Africa currently regulating executive director remuneration? 
(d) How have the United Kingdom and Australia regulated executive director 
remuneration? 
(e) Is South Africa doing enough to regulate executive director remuneration? 
(f) What lessons can South Africa learn from the United Kingdom and Australia (if 
any)?  
1.5.2  Research Methodology 
The methodology of the dissertation is to mainly look at the legal and regulatory 
frameworks governing the remuneration of directors in South Africa and employ a 
comparative approach. The methodology adopted is appropriate on account that director’s 
remuneration is a global issue affecting all countries and the rules and principles dealing 
with the issue can be different or similar from country to country. As a science or in its 
theoretical-descriptive form, comparative law aims to acquire better knowledge of law and 
attempts to discover to what degree the rules are similar or different and help us discover 
other methods for resolving the same problems.35 From the comparative approach 
                                                  
35 R Sacco ‘Legal Formants: A dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’ (1991) 39 Am J Comp 1 at 
5.  See also generally J Gordley ‘Comparative Legal Research: Its Function in the Development of 
Harmonized Law’ (1995) 43 Am J Comp 555 at 555. 
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perspective, the dissertation critically examines the research topic by analysing the relevant 
statutes and other legal instruments such as the King Code on Corporate Governance 2009 
and Johannesburg Stock Exchange Listing Requirements. In addition, secondary sources 
such as textbooks, journal articles and, where appropriate, internet sources will also be 
used.  
1.6  Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organised into five chapters as outlined below.  
Chapter One provides the general overview of the dissertation. 
Chapter Two lays down the foundations of good corporate governance by discussing 
its meaning, importance and relevance in the world. It will also briefly discuss the 
development of corporate governance in South Africa over the years. It will highlight the 
corporate governance enforcement mechanisms in South Africa in order to gain a better 
appreciation of how executive remuneration is regulated in South Africa. Executive 
remuneration as a corporate governance issue in South Africa will also be discussed. 
Chapter Three evaluates the existing regulatory frameworks in South Africa 
regarding executive director’s remuneration. It will look at the different ways in which 
executives’ remuneration packages are structured and the manner of regulation provided 
under the King Code on Corporate Governance 2009, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and 
JSE Listings Requirements. 
Chapter Four compares and contrasts the United Kingdom and Australia’s corporate 
governance laws and regulations in as far as executive director’s remuneration is concerned 
with the objective of finding out the lessons that can that can be drawn by South Africa in 
order to improve its own regulation. 
Chapter Five is the concluding chapter. It summarizes the key findings from the 
dissertation and proposes recommendations towards achieving better regulation of 
executive director’s remuneration.  
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CHAPTER 2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
To fully appreciate and understand the importance and relevance of the issues relating to 
regulation of executive pay, corporate governance, its principles and the objectives it seeks 
to achieve must first be understood. Corporate governance is unique field of study because 
of its evolutionary nature meaning that the issues and principles relating to it are constantly 
changing and improving in response to the current global trends and developments.37 This 
can be seen in the number of good governance practice codes that have been released 
globally since the United Kingdom’s Cadbury Report in 1992. South Africa alone, which 
has set international standards of best practice38 and is considered by many to be among 
the best in the world,39  has issued three King Codes of Governance Principles since 1994 
and over 30 Practice Notes since the release of the King III Report on Corporate 
Governance in 2009. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to discuss the importance of corporate 
governance, what it seeks to achieve and how it seeks to achieve it. As a system that sets 
out the best principles and practices that guide directors and other officers in a corporation, 
corporate governance seeks to enforce leadership that is characterised by the four ethical 
values of accountability, responsibility, fairness and transparency. In order to ensure that 
these principles and practices are upheld codes of governance and other supplementary 
enforcement mechanisms such as the JSE Listings Requirements and the Companies Act 
71 of 200840  have been put in place to ensure compliance. This Chapter will therefore 
briefly discuss these regulatory mechanisms and also seek to demonstrate the problems 
associated with executive remuneration in relation to South Africa.  
 
 
 
                                                  
37 King III Introduction and Background at 5. 
38 J Schulschenk ‘Interview Summary Report: Corporate Governance Research 
Programme’ Albert Luthuli Centre for Responsible Leadership, August 2012, 
available at 
https://web.up.ac.za/.../2013_alcrl_Interview%20summary%20report%20web.p
df, accessed 6 August 2014, 4. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Hereinafter referred to as Companies Act 2008. 
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2.2 Defining Corporate Governance 
One important aspect about corporate governance is that it has no generally accepted 
definition.41 In its initial development stages the definition adopted was that corporate 
governance is ‘the system by which companies are directed and controlled’.42 This 
definition, narrow as it may be and having its origins from the 1992 Cadbury Report, is 
still considered by many as the most authoritative description of what corporate governance 
really is. However, with the constant evolving world developments and the general non-
static nature of corporate governance, this definition has evolved through the years and has 
become much broader to include concepts such as accountability, sustainability, ethical 
leadership and corporate citizenship. Corporate governance has over the years also 
recognized the need for building relationships and developing interests with the various 
stakeholders, such as shareowners, employees and lenders.43 
The OECD, defines corporate governance as follows:  
‘Corporate governance…involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper 
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the 
interests of the company and shareholders and should facilitate effective 
monitoring, thereby encouraging firms to use resources more efficiently.’44  
King III defines corporate governance as the establishment of structures and 
processes, with appropriate checks and balances to enable directors to discharge their legal 
responsibilities, and ensure compliance with legal and regulatory obligations.45  
From the definitions above it can be concluded that corporate governance is 
essentially about ensuring that there are structures, procedures and principles in place that 
are aimed at ensuring that an organisation is able to achieve its long-term goals whilst also 
taking into account the needs and interests of all relevant stakeholders. It is also about 
                                                  
41 JJ Du Plessis et al Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 1ed 
(2005) 1. 
42 Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance op cit (n18) 15. 
43 Kneale op cit (n19) 4. 
44 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance op cit (n5).  
45 King III Introduction and Background at 6. 
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ensuring that those exercising power (the board) discharge their legal duties in a manner 
that is in the best interests of the company and in line with the relevant laws and regulatory 
mechanisms. Lastly, corporate governance is also about ensuring responsible behaviour by 
corporations. 
Governance of corporations is sometimes mistaken to be concerned with the day to 
day running of a company by the business executives, however, it is rather concerned with 
how power of these executive managers is shared and exercised to direct business 
operations. It’s also not concerned with formulating business strategy but rather encourages 
board directors to take strategic decisions.46 
2.3 Importance of Corporate Governance 
Companies today play a very important role in today’s society because in addition to 
providing goods and services they are also economic institutions47 creating wealth for 
shareholders, employees, customers and the society at large. For shareholders wealth is 
created when the company is able to generate profits and increase shareholder wealth, for 
employees wealth is generated when employment is available and employees are able to 
earn an income, for consumers it means a wide range of choice in the products and services 
offered and for the society at large it means a stronger economy, particularly, when the 
business sector of a country is healthy and diverse.  
In addition to the economic impact that they have on society, companies are also 
regarded as corporate citizens and as such they have to consider the impact of their 
decisions, operations and actions on the social, economic and environmental life of the 
community within which they operate48 as well consider its own reputation, sustainability 
and longevity.49 
Ramani Naidoo explains the corporate citizen’s concept as follows:  
‘Corporate citizenship entails companies fulfilling obligations to the broader 
society within which they operate and being responsible for their actions in 
society. It goes beyond satisfying mere legal or regulatory standards; it demands 
                                                  
              46 Kneale op cit (n19) 5. 
47 R Naidoo Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South Africa    
Companies 2ed (2009) 241.            
              48 Massie op cit (n2) xx. 
              49 Naidoo op cit (n47) 316. 
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that companies that are good corporate citizens are sensitive to their impact on 
all their internal and external stakeholders.’50 
Though companies are recognized as juristic persons they nonetheless require the 
collective effort of different individuals to govern them for their sustainability and 
longevity.51 The board of directors, who are entrusted with this responsibility of directing 
and controlling the company, have to ensure that when exercising their duties their personal 
interests are kept separate from those of the company and its owners. Good corporate 
governance thus exists to ensure that the interests of the shareholders, directors and other 
interest groups are sufficiently satisfied.52 
Good corporate governance is a virtue that advocates for leadership that is effective 
and responsible. Leadership is said to be effective and responsible when it is characterised 
by the ethical values of responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency.53 
Responsibility requires the board to be able to take care of the assets and actions of the 
company and be willing to take corrective action to keep the company on a strategic path 
that is ethical and sustainable. Accountability requires the board to be able to justify 
decisions and actions to shareholders and other stakeholders. Fairness requires the board 
to ensure that it gives fair consideration to the legitimate interest and expectations of all 
stakeholders of the company. Transparency requires the board to disclose information in a 
manner that enables stakeholders to make informed analysis of the company’s 
performance, and sustainability.54 
Good governance is also said to make ‘good business sense’55 because when applied 
correctly it provides numerous benefits including, inter alia, the following; Firstly, 
companies that are well governed and provide high levels of disclosure tend to have easier 
access to and lower costs of capital because investors have improved knowledge of the 
company’s business strategy and performance.56 Secondly, good corporate governance 
systems encourage increased foreign direct investment (FDI), which subsequently leads to 
                                                  
50 Ibid at 241. 
51 Kneale op cit (n19) 6. 
52 Ibid and see section 7(i) Companies Act 2008. 
53 Kopel op cit (n31) 440. 
54 Ibid at 441. 
55 Naidoo op cit (n47) 10. 
56 The Case for Corporate Governance: What is Corporate Governance?, 
available at http://go.worldbank.org/LHV3EZQV10, accessed 3 August 2014. 
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greater efficiencies in the financial and banking sectors.57 Thirdly, the company’s overall 
performance improves because there is efficient management in place, better asset 
allocation, innovation is encouraged and improvements in productivity.58 
Fourthly, companies with sound corporate governance practices have better risk 
management system, and are more likely to cope with corporate crises and scandals, than 
those without. These risk management systems include enterprise risk management, 
disaster recovery systems, medium management techniques and lastly business continuity 
procedures.59 Lastly, it encourages competitive advantage which is used to maximize a 
company’s performance, increase a company’s potential to encourage capital investment, 
and positively influence a country’s ability to attract foreign investment.60 
2.4 South African Developments in Corporate Governance   
During the apartheid era South Africa was an almost entirely isolated economy due to the 
international sanctions imposed on it. A common feature that existed amongst many of the 
large corporations at the time was that many of them were family owned conglomerates 
with little to no corporate governance practices in place.61 These companies were 
essentially characterized as being complacent and ineffectively managed.62 
As  South Africa was preparing to enter the global market as a newly democratic 
nation, the King Committee was called upon in 1992 , at the instance of  Institute of 
Directors (IoD) and headed by former Judge and Professor Mervyn King, to establish a 
code of corporate governance which would promote the highest standards of corporate 
governance in South Africa whilst taking into account global trends, the need to enable 
successful business environments for emerging business men and women entering into the 
South African economy, and the importance of ensuring South Africa’s competitiveness in 
the global market.63 
The end product of the Commission was the release of South Africa’s very first King 
Code of Corporate Governance (King I) in 1994. King I provided the financial and 
                                                  
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Schulschenk op cit (n38) 6. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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regulatory aspects of corporate governance but also went a step further then its international 
counterparts at the time by strongly advocating for an integrated approach to corporate 
governance having regard to good social, ethical and environmental practices. In addition, 
King I also advocated for the inclusivity and centrality of the stakeholder.64 This meant that 
King I recognised that the needs, interests and expectations of the shareholders and also 
those of the stakeholders such as the community in which the company operates, its 
employees, investors, customers, environment etc. need to be considered when developing 
company strategy. 
Following the international and local developments in corporate governance coupled 
with the growing awareness of the need for sustainable development,65 the second King 
Code of Corporate Governance (King II) was released in 2002. It was primarily aimed at 
providing a comprehensive assessment on corporate governance before defining practical 
principles to guide companies.66 King II saw the introduction of a number of new concepts 
and principles relating to corporate governance. These included, inter alia, the introduction 
of the concept of sustainable triple bottom line reporting, risk management and internal 
auditing.  
King III was released on 1 September 2009 and its release was prompted by the 
changes to the company law regime within the country, in particular, the enactment of the 
Companies Act 2008, which had incorporated aspects of King I and II into law.67 Its release 
was also based on the need to align the report with international governance trends, for 
example director remuneration.68 King III advocates for the need to produce integrated 
reports in place of annual financial reports and a separate sustainability report. It also 
strongly advocates for ethical leadership, sustainability and corporate citizenship.69 In 
contrast to its predecessors, King III is applicable to all companies public, private and non-
profit.70 It saw a shift from the ‘comply and explain’ approach, adopted in King I and II, to 
the ‘apply or explain approach.71 The report incorporated a number of global emerging 
                                                  
64 Kneale op cit (n19) 226. 
65 Schulschenk op cit (n38) 9.  
66 Ibid. 
67 Naidoo op cit (n47) 34. 
68 Ibid. 
69 King III Introduction and Background at 10. 
70 King III Introduction and Background at 17. 
71 Schulschenk op cit (n38) 12. 
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trends, such as, alternative dispute resolution, risk based internal audit etc. It also addressed 
issues previously not included in King Reports I and II, including IT governance, business 
rescue and fundamental and affected transactions in terms of director’s responsibilities 
during mergers, acquisitions and amalgamations.72 In addition to the codes of principles 
and practices, the King Committee issues intermittently Practice Notes in order to keep 
King III relevant. These Practice Notes are aimed at providing guidance on how the 
principles should be applied.73 
Despite the changes and improvements made over the years the three King Reports 
have all shared some common features. These include the fact that they all contain a Code 
of Corporate Practices and Conduct which are read together with the Reports.74 The Codes 
aim at setting out key corporate governance principles, whilst the Reports set out best 
practice recommendations on how to carry out each principle. Also, the reports have all 
consistently adopted the principle-based approach which means that the codes are a set of 
principles and not law or regulation.75  
A crucial step to the evolution of corporate governance in South Africa was made 
when certain aspects of King II became part of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
Listings Requirements.76 This meant that listed companies were now required to comply 
with the provisions of the King Code as well as include in their annual reports the extent 
of and reasons for any non-compliance.77 JSE Listings Requirements currently still require 
listed companies to comply with King III and failure to do so amounts to breach of the 
listings requirements as companies are contractually bound to comply.78 
South Africa is described as having a hybrid corporate governance system because 
enforcement of governance obligations is comprised of a combination of both the 
legislature and codes of principles and practices.79 Whilst the governance obligations are 
aimed at setting appropriate standards of conduct for the directors as to how they should 
                                                  
72 Ibid at 275. 
73 King III Practice Notes, available at http://www.iodsa.co.za/?king3, accessed 
on 7 September 2014. 
74 Cassim op cit (n20) 474. 
75 Schulschenk op cit (n38) 8. 
76 Ibid at 8. 
77 Ibid at 36. 
78 JSE Listings Requirement 1.11. 
79 TH Mongalo et al Modern Company Law for a Competitive South African 
Economy 1ed (2010) 447. 
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direct the business of the company and take decisions, the law, on the other hand, sets the 
framework in which the companies should operate by imposing legal obligations backed 
with sanctions for non-compliance.80 The combined effect of the two leads to a country 
with good governance structures and better compliance with the law. 
In terms of legislature in South Africa there are various statutory instruments which 
impose certain governance obligations on companies and its directors, though sometimes 
they do so indirectly. These statutory instruments include the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995, Competition Act 89 of 1998, Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, just to 
name a few. However, the main statute providing for most governance provisions is the 
Companies Act 2008 which aims, inter alia, to encourage transparency and high standards 
of corporate governance within South Africa, given the significant enterprises play within 
the social and economic life of the nation.81 The Act has partially incorporated some of the 
principles and recommendations from King II and the common law into legislature as 
means of achieving high standards of corporate governance within the country.82 An 
example of one of the governance principles that have been codified relates to the 
production of annual financial statements which must disclose the directors’ remuneration 
and benefits.83 The rationale for codifying this principle is to ensure transparency with 
regards to director’s remuneration thereby enabling stakeholders to make informed 
analysis of the company’s performance, and sustainability. 
2.5 Executive Remuneration  
Due to immense media pressure, executive remuneration as a contemporary corporate 
governance issue in South Africa was addressed in the 2002 King II,84 through the 
introduction of the principle of full disclosure of director remuneration. Prior to that 
executive remuneration as a corporate governance issue was addressed and regulated but 
not to the extent as it is regulated today. For example, under King I director remuneration 
was addressed in a very limited manner because the recommendations provided only for 
the establishment of a remuneration committee, comprising of non-executive directors, and 
                                                  
80 Ibid. 
81 Section 7 (b) (iii) Companies Act 2008. 
82 Cassim op cit (n20) 507. 
83 Section 30 (4) (a) Companies Act 2008. 
84 Ibid 
 19 
 
for full and clear disclosure of the total of executive’s earnings.85 King II and III, on the 
other hand, took further steps and introduced new concepts like recommending that levels 
of remuneration be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate executives of the quality 
required by the board and introducing the concept of performance related pay.86 The key 
difference between the two codes of governance is that whilst King II laid the foundations 
for governance of executive remuneration, King III built on those foundations by taking 
into account the direction in which the global market is moving as well as the demands of 
the institutional investors.87 
Generally it is accepted that directors are greatly motivated to perform their duties 
well if they are adequately remunerated and it is also widely accepted that high 
remuneration for directors, be largely dependent on company performance.88 Traditionally, 
the justifications for the high income levels for executives in South Africa were based on 
economic perspectives, namely that compensation, as the cost of executive skill , is driven 
by supply and demand and in particular shortages of skill at this level within the South 
African market. Another factor included enhanced mobility of executives-particularly after 
South Africa became a democratic nation in 1994. This meant that international executives 
could now come into the country and work, South African executives were also accepted 
into the international market and South African companies could now compete in the world 
economy.89 All these changes meant that the salaries of executives had to be at a 
competitive level with other countries in order for the South African companies to be able 
to retain these individuals. 
King III in recognition of the overall legal and moral obligation that a company has 
to the economic, social and natural environment consequently advocates for companies to 
be corporate citizens.90 This means that companies should take into account the impact of 
their operations and actions on the social, economic and natural life of the community 
within which they operate. However, research conducted on the levels of executive pay and 
                                                  
85 King Code I of Corporate Practices and Conduct Chapter 20 Principle 6.1 and 
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income inequality in South Africa91 suggests that companies are not fulfilling their duties 
as corporate citizens because as the levels of executive pay rise so does the income gap 
between the executives and average workers resulting in negative impacts on the social and 
economic life of  South Africans. 
In terms of the impact on social life, high executive pay in South Africa has 
contributed to income disparities. The research conducted by the Labour Research 
Service,92 found that of the 296 executive directors in 83 companies and across 14 
economic sectors, the average annual remuneration for the executive director was 
R7 739 970 and that of the chief executive officers was on average R11 902 463. This 
means that it would take 15 years, 174 years, and 267 years of work for a low average 
worker to earn what an average non- executive director, executive director and CEO 
respectively earned in 2012.93  The problem then associated with these large income 
disparities is that it brings along with it many health and social problems to the country 
including high levels of crime and violence, corruption, low levels of trust for both 
interpersonal relationships and the government, it brings about division in society, 
decreased life expectancy and high levels of strike action.94  
The economic impact of high executive pay on South Africa’s economy is that it 
hampers economic growth as private investors become reluctant to invest their money in 
companies that reward their leaders far too much. This is true because high pay erodes 
company capital and dividend returns to shareholders. Additionally, social problems, like 
corruption, have an impact on economic growth because they deter potential investors who 
need accountability and transparency in the way their money is being used by a company.95 
Therefore, if corruption levels are high in a country then investors become discouraged to 
invest in such a country. 
The disparities in income levels coupled with the adverse economic and social 
problems they bring to a country demonstrate the importance of regulating executive 
                                                  
91 See generally Massie op cit (n2).  
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remuneration in South Africa, especially as a middle income developing country whose 
plans include reducing inequality from 0.7 to 0.6 by 2030.96  
2.6 Conclusion 
The above discussion has shown the strides South Africa has made in attempting to resolve 
the agency problem by setting up structures and processes which are essentially aimed 
ensuring that there is sufficient division of power, transparency, discipline, responsibility 
and accountability in a company.  The chapter has also shown the importance of regulating 
executive remuneration in South Africa. The next chapter will look in detail at how South 
Africa has attempted to resolve the problems associated with executive remuneration 
through its various regulatory mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 3 REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have outlined the problems associated with excessive executive 
remuneration, particularly with regard to South Africa, and how excessive executive 
remuneration is linked to the corporate governance debate. The objective of this chapter is 
to discuss the different regulatory frameworks within South Africa and how they regulate 
executive director remuneration. The chapter will do so in two parts whereby the first part 
of the chapter will focus on discussing who executive directors are, what their remuneration 
package consists of and how they are structured. The second part of this chapter will then 
go on to look at how the remuneration of executives is regulated in South Africa with 
particular reference to King III, the Companies Act 2008 and the JSE Listings 
Requirements. 
3.2 Who are Executive Directors? 
The Companies Act 2008 makes no distinction between executive and non-executive 
directors,96 it does however, under s 66 (4), recognize for four types of directors; a director 
appointed in terms of the Memorandum of Incorporation,97 an ex officio director,98 an 
alternative director99 and a director elected by the shareholders.100 The Act defines directors 
in general terms by regarding them as members of the board or alternate directors.101 King 
III, on the other hand, makes a clear distinction between the executive and non-executive 
directors and it describes the executive directors as those directors who are involved in the 
day-to-day management of the company.102 They are also considered to be salaried full-
time employees of the company, having specific functional duties and generally under a 
contract of service with the company.103 Executive directors are described as having a 
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dichotomy of roles104  because whilst on one hand they exercise a fiduciary role as directors 
of the company, in which capacity they are expected to attend board meetings and exercise 
control over management, on the other hand, they exercise their role as senior managers, 
in which capacity they are answerable to the company’s board of directors. Examples of 
executive directors include the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO). Non-executive directors are regarded to be part-time directors and are not 
employees of the company. Instead of being involved in the day to day management of the 
company, non-executive directors rather provide objective and independent judgement on 
issues facing the company.105  
3.3 Remuneration Packages of Executive Directors 
The remuneration packages of executive directors can comprise of either fixed or variable 
elements.106 The fixed component of the executive’s remuneration is paid to them 
irrespective of company or individual performance and the variable component of the 
remuneration is directly linked with performance of the company or the individual. 
Generally the remuneration packages are structured in three main ways which may consist 
of a combination of the following: the guaranteed packages, which are fixed, the short-term 
incentives and long-term incentives, which are both variable. The short and long-term 
incentives are a part of the remuneration package for the executives which are intended to 
offer incentives to the executives for achieving performance targets, and should comprise 
a substantial element in the total remuneration package.107 
The guaranteed package of the remuneration is the portion of an executive’s 
remuneration that is guaranteed every year irrespective of the executive’s or company’s 
performance.108 This means that it is not in any way linked to the executive’s performance 
or the company’s and it may even be subject to annual increases.  Guaranteed packages 
include annual basic salaries, company pension contributions, medical benefits and 
allowances that an executive may be entitled to by virtue of his job.109 The guaranteed 
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package is paid to the executive directors in recognition of them being salaried full-time 
employees. 
Short-term Incentives (STIs) are described as being ‘risk-based’ as they are not 
guaranteed in any way and are wholly dependent on whether the executive or the company 
is performing as expected, meaning that they are performance related payments.110 Similar 
to guaranteed packages, short-term incentives are also paid yearly. Examples of short-term 
incentives include annual lump sum bonuses which may be tied to annual financial 
performance of the company as well as various other perks like private use of company jets 
or boats.111 The purpose of the short-term incentives is to give executive directors an 
incentive to achieve performance targets.112 
Long-term Incentives (LTIs) refer to all cash and equity-based awards that are paid 
to the executives based on company performance over a period longer than 12 months and 
may be subject to vesting conditions.113 The cash-based rewards include cash payments 
that are guaranteed only once the vesting conditions have been met. Equity-based rewards 
provide a reward based on a market driven equity114 and they can come in one of two ways. 
Either they will be performance-based meaning that they will be granted for the purpose of 
awarding the executive for reaching or exceeding their individual or company performance 
targets or they will be retention-based meaning they will be granted solely to promote 
retention of the executive whilst they remain employed by the company. The main 
difference between long-term incentives and the other pay packages is that the former vests 
over a specified period of time, usually between one to five years.  In addition, they are 
capable of being sold or transferred by the executive where they have vested and all of the 
performance criteria and conditions associated with it have been met.115 
The purpose of the long-term incentives is to align the interests of executive directors 
and shareholders by giving the executives a stake in company’s future.116 Share-options 
are a typical example of LTIs that align the interests of executive directors and 
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shareholders. They are aimed at giving their holders the right to purchase shares in the 
company at a fixed price, which is called the strike price, at any time between two future 
dates.117 While share-options are intended to align the interests of executives with the 
shareowners, the problem associated with them is that while executives have their options, 
they also have personal interests in seeing the share price go up because the larger the 
increase, the bigger the personal profit to the option holder.118  
In addition to the above-mentioned pay structures executive directors are often also 
paid compensation for loss of office, commonly referred to as severance payments, which 
are generally paid when the executive is dismissed from office for unsatisfactory 
performance or any other related reason. Actual compensation amounts paid for loss of 
office is often negotiated, involving industrial relations experts and lawyers. Good 
corporate governance principles require that confidentiality agreements should not apply 
to the details of any compensation agreement.119 
3.4 Regulation of Executive Remuneration 
3.4.1 King Code of Corporate Governance (2009) 
3.4.1.1 Remuneration Policy  
The general principle with respect to the setting out of executives’ remuneration is that 
companies must offer remuneration packages that are sufficient to attract, retain and 
motivate individuals of the required calibre.120 At the same time companies also have to be 
careful and protect their own interests and those of the relevant stakeholders by not paying 
excessive remuneration. In recognition of a company’s position in attempting to balance 
out the two interests above, King III recommends that companies remunerate their 
executives’ fairly and responsibly.121 Whilst King III does not define what fairly and 
responsibly means, it nonetheless requires that the remuneration policies and practices for 
the executives’ be aligned with the strategy adopted by the company.122 Additionally, King 
III recommends the appointment of a special committee, called the remuneration 
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committee, which will review the remuneration policy regularly and ensure that it is linked 
to the director’s contribution to company performance.123 
3.4.1.2 Remuneration Committee  
The responsibility of setting up and administering the remuneration policies of executive 
directors is the duty of the remuneration committee as duly appointed by the board of 
directors.124 The rationale for establishing the remuneration committee for the purpose of 
assisting the Board is that, since it is comprised of a majority of non-executive directors of 
which the majority must be independent non-executive directors,125 then objective 
judgment will be exercised by it when setting out and administering the remuneration 
policies of the executive directors. Additionally, the establishment of the remuneration 
committee enhances the effectiveness of the board of directors because the committee 
advises the board on matters specifically delegated to it in terms of the remuneration 
committee’s terms of reference.126 To further enhance objective and independent 
judgement, the chairman of the remuneration committee should not be the chair of the 
board because it is the board that appoints the committee.127 However, the board chairman 
may be a member of the committee and the committee should always obtain the input from 
the board chairman on the performance of the CEO regardless of whether or not the board 
chair is a remuneration committee member. The composition of the remuneration 
committee must be disclosed in the annual integrated report128 which provides a holistic 
and integrated report of the company’s financial and sustainability performance.129 
When setting out the remuneration policy, the remuneration committee should ensure 
that the policy is a balance between the fixed and the variable components of the total 
remuneration of executives.130 This means that the policy should address base pay and 
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bonuses, employee contracts, severance and retirement benefits as well as share-based and 
other long-term incentive schemes.131  
In relation to base pay and bonuses, the remuneration committee should ensure that 
remuneration levels reflect the contribution of the executive to the company,132 in particular 
yearly bonuses should clearly relate to performance against yearly objectives consistent 
with the long-term value for shareholders.133 In an effort to ensure that director pay is 
indeed linked to performance, employment contracts should not provide for payment or 
allow automatic entitlement to bonuses or share based payments in the event of a 
termination arising from the executive’s failure or early termination.134 Furthermore, in 
relation to share-based incentives, the remuneration committee is required to review 
incentive schemes regularly in order to ensure their continued contribution to shareholder 
value, and guard against unjustified windfalls and inappropriate gains from the operation 
of share-based incentives.135 To ensure that share-based incentives are aligned with the 
interests of both the executives and the shareholders and that they reward performance, 
participation in share-based incentives should be restricted to employees and executives 
only.136 Additionally, share-based incentives, including any proposals to such or employee 
share schemes, must be subjected to shareholder approval whereby the remuneration 
committee will explain clearly the intended application of the scheme, the relationship to 
the overall remuneration policy and the cost of the scheme to the company.137 
Overall the remuneration committee should ensure that it scrutinizes all the benefits 
paid to directors, including pensions, benefits in kind and other financial arrangements in 
order to ensure that they are justified, correctly valued and suitably disclosed.138  
Once the board and the remuneration committee have settled on the remuneration 
policy and its implementation thereof, the policy is then subjected to shareholder approval 
by way of a non-binding advisory vote at the shareholders AGM, before it is 
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implemented.139 The non-binding advisory vote will essentially require shareholders to 
take a vote at the AGM on the remuneration policy and although it will not be binding on 
the board, it will nonetheless give an indication as to whether the shareholders are in 
support of the remuneration practices adopted by the company or not.140 As this particular 
vote is not a statutory requirement, there is strictly no legal minimum threshold that needs 
to be achieved. However King III recommends reaching an approval minimum of 50% plus 
one vote. These recommendations are intended to ensure that the remuneration that is paid 
to directors is subjected to some form of scrutiny and does not go unchecked before 
implementation. 
3.4.1.3 Disclosure of Executive Remuneration 
In an effort to promote the governance principles of transparency and accountability 
companies are required to disclose the remuneration of each individual director and 
prescribed officer in the annual remuneration report,141 which is included in the annual 
integrated report.142 The remuneration report should disclose details of all benefits paid 
to directors including: policy on base pay, participation in share incentives schemes, the 
use of benchmarks, incentive schemes to encourage retention, justification of salaries 
above the median, material payments that are ex-gratia in nature, policies regarding 
executive employment, and the maximum expected potential dilution as a result of 
incentive awards.143 In addition, the company is also required to explain in the annual 
remuneration report the remuneration policies followed throughout the company, how 
the said policies will be implemented and the strategic objectives that the company 
seeks to achieve.144 
The rationale for requiring such extensive disclosure is to deter directors from 
committing acts that amount to misconduct or derogation from their duties which 
effectively reduces malpractice or excessive executive compensation. It is also necessary 
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as it brings to light any form of misconduct and non-compliance by the executives enabling 
shareholders and other interested parties to take appropriate corrective action. 
3.4.1.4 Shareholders Approval of Remuneration 
As mentioned earlier, the company’s remuneration policy is expected to be tabled to the 
shareholders annually for a non-binding advisory vote at the AGM before it is 
implemented.145 The rationale for this requirement is to afford the shareholders an 
opportunity to express their views on the proposed remuneration policy before it is actually 
implemented. Some commentators suggest that the vote by shareholders could potentially 
be binding on the company in that where the shareholders vote against a remuneration 
policy, the remuneration committee would have to devise a new policy.146 However, 
because the vote is non-mandatory in nature the potential of it being binding on the 
company is unlikely. After the remuneration policy is put to the shareholders vote, the 
board should then determine the remuneration of executives in accordance with the policy 
put to the shareholders vote.147 
3.4.2 Companies Act 71 of 2008 
3.4.2.1 Memorandum of Incorporation and Shareholder Approval 
The Companies Act 2008 does not provide directors with an automatic right to be 
remunerated for their services as directors148, and unless the Memorandum of Incorporation 
and a special resolution approved by the shareholders voting at a general meeting within 
the previous two years expressly provide for the payment of remuneration, the said 
remuneration will not be paid.149 
The Act provides as follows at s 66 (8) and (9): 
‘(8) Except to the extent that the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company 
provides otherwise, the company may pay remuneration to its directors for their 
service as directors, subject to subsection (9). 
(9)Remuneration contemplated in sub-section (8) may be paid only in 
accordance with a Special Resolution approved by the Shareholders within the 
previous two years.’ 
                                                  
145 King III Principle 2.27. 
146 Kneale op cit (n19) 191. 
147 King III Principle 2.27.2. 
148 Cassim op cit (n20) 454. 
149 Section 66 (8) and (9) Companies Act 2008. 
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This section must be read with s 65 which deals with shareholders resolutions, in 
particular, ss (11) which sets out instances within which a special resolution will be 
required. Section 65 (11) (h) reads as follows: ‘authorize the basis for compensation to 
directors of a profit company, as required by section 66 (9);’ 
The effect of s 66(8) and (9) is such that, payment of directors’ remuneration under 
the Act, is dependent on the Memorandum of Incorporation providing for it, and then actual 
payment being effected because there is a special resolution in place which has been 
approved by the shareholders within the previous two years. Should the Memorandum of 
Incorporation not provide for director remuneration, the board of directors may not cause 
the company to remunerate the directors nor can the directors remunerate themselves out 
of the company funds as this would amount to a breach of their fiduciary duty and render 
them liable to pay damages.150 In addition, for directors to be entitled to payment, the 
shareholders must approve the payment of the remuneration within the previous two years 
meaning that approval may not be given retrospectively.151 If such remuneration is paid 
without the special resolution, then the remuneration is invalidly paid and thereby 
recoverable by the company or liquidator.152  
Section 66(8) further provides that a company may pay remuneration to its directors 
for their ‘service as directors’, subject to the Memorandum of Incorporation. The use of the 
words ‘service as directors’ in this context is not clear as to whether it refers to the directors’ 
service in their capacity as directors, such as fees for attending board meetings, or in any 
other capacity, for example as an employee.153 This confusion is further heightened by the 
lack of a distinction between the executive and non-executive director under the Act and 
the absence of a clear contractual term. The effect of the lack of clarity over the use of the 
words ‘service as directors’ is that if s 66(8) is narrowly interpreted it means that 
shareholders would only have a say on the amounts paid to persons acting as directors and 
would not have any input in relation the remuneration packages of executive directors in 
their capacity as employees of the company.154  
                                                  
150 Cassim op cit (n20) 454 and s 77 (2) (a) Companies Act 2008. 
151 Ibid at 455. 
152 Ibid and s 77(2) (a) Companies Act 2008. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Luiz op cit (n15) 293. 
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3.4.2.2 Disclosure of Remuneration 
In order to ensure transparency and accountability, the Act under s 30 (4)-(6) requires 
companies to disclose the remuneration and benefits received by directors by including it 
in the annual financial statements for any company that is to be audited. The Act further 
requires that the information that is to be disclosed under s 30 (4) to satisfy the prescribed 
standards, and must show the amount of any remuneration or benefits paid to or receivable 
by persons in respect of services rendered as directors or services rendered while being 
directors of the company.155 The term remuneration under the Act156 is defined broadly to 
include, inter alia, fees paid to directors for services rendered by them, salaries, bonuses 
and performance-related payments, expense allowances, pension scheme contributions, 
value of any option, loans etc. The rationale for the provisions requiring disclosure is to 
enhance financial discipline, transparency and accountability as well as to ensure that the 
detailed information provided is clear and understandable to those that are interpreting it. 
There is also a belief that increased disclosure and scrutiny shames the executives into 
accepting lower remuneration.157 
In an effort to ensure that there is accurate disclosure of remuneration and benefits 
paid to directors as well as to hold directors accountable, the Act imposes liability on 
directors who sign, consent to, or authorise the publication of any financial statements that 
are false or misleading in a material respect particularly when the company suffers any 
loss, damages or costs as a result of the directors actions.158 
The Companies Act 2008 empowers the board to appoint committees and delegate 
authority to such committees,159 however, unlike King III, it does not specifically require 
the appointment of remuneration committees to make decisions or recommendations as to 
the remuneration of executives. The Act also doesn’t expressly require the remuneration of 
directors to be contingent on company earning sufficient profits.160 However, the Markham 
                                                  
155 Section 30 (5) Companies Act 2008. 
156 Section 30 (6) Companies Act 2008. 
157 D Collier et al ‘Income Inequality and Executive Remuneration: Assessing the Role of Law and 
Policy in the Pursuit of Equality’ (2010) 34 SAJLR 84 at 94. 
158 Section 77(3) (d) (i) Companies Act 2008.  
159 Section 72 Companies Act 71 2008. 
160 Cassim op cit (n20) 456. 
 32 
 
v South Africa Finance & Industrial Co Ltd161 case provides that should a director be 
entitled to be remunerated, that remuneration is a debt owed by the company and should 
the company be wound up, the director will be entitled to claim the remunerations owed to 
him or her in competition with the companies ordinary creditors. Additionally, the 
Companies Act 2008 has does not impose any specific condition requiring the preparation 
of a remuneration policy and its explanation. It only requires the preparation of annual 
financial statements and a directors report which are to be audited.162 
3.4.3 Other Legislation 
In addition to the Companies Act 2008, there are other statutes which regulate executive 
remuneration to a certain extent.  Examples of these statutes include the Employment 
Equity Act 55 of 1998, Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and the Public Finance Management 
Act 1 of 1999. 
3.4.3.1 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
This Act is primarily aimed at achieving equity in the work place163 and it contains a 
provision imposing an obligation on employers to submit a statement to the Employment 
Conditions Commission, on the remuneration and benefits received in each occupational 
category and level164 of that employer’s workforce.165 Where the reporting levels reveal 
disproportionate income differentials, the employer is required to take measures to reduce 
the differentials.166 However, certain payments, including share-incentive schemes and 
discretionary payments not related to an employee’s hours of work or performances (for 
example, discretionary profit-sharing schemes) are, however, excluded from the 
calculation of remuneration for the purposes of section 27 reporting (EEA4 form).167  
This provision is relevant to executives because they are not just directors of a 
company but are also full time salaried employees. Therefore, by requiring employers to 
disclose the remuneration of its entire workforce, transparency in the remuneration levels 
                                                  
161 Markham v South Africa Finance & Industrial Co Ltd 1962 (3) SA 669 (A). 
162 Section 30 (2) (a) and (3) Companies Act 2008. 
163 Section 2 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
164 Occupational levels are identified in form EEA9 of the Employment Equity Act and include top 
and senior management e.g. executive directors. 
165 Ibid at Section 27 (1) Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
166 Ibid at Section 27 (2) Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
167 Collier op cit (n157) 91. 
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of all employees is encouraged. Additionally, the income differentials gap is narrowed 
because the employer is under an obligation to take the measures outlined under s 27(3) of 
the Act. 
3.4.3.2 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
In an effort to curb excesses in executive pay, certain aspects of the executive’s 
remuneration and benefits are subjected to the payment of income tax. By virtue of 
executive directors being salaried full time employees, their remuneration is subject to the 
withholding of employees’ tax on a monthly basis in the same manner as any other 
employee.168 The provisions of paragraph 11C of the Fourth Schedule of the  Act takes into 
consideration the total remuneration the director received in the previous year, including 
the incentive elements, so that adequate employees’ tax is withheld during the course of 
the tax year. The total remuneration includes, for example, salaries, bonuses, fringe benefits 
and most type of allowances. Section 8C further subjects share-incentives to taxation on 
the gain made on the instrument at the time that instrument vests and any restrictions on its 
exercise are removed. The executive in this instance will be taxed as soon as the instrument 
vests without restrictions.169 
3.4.3.3 Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 
This Act applies to all state owned enterprises and it aims to promote the objective of good 
financial management through effective and efficient use of the limited resources as well 
as to govern the responsibilities of the officials of the state owned enterprises.170 As a way 
of promoting transparency and ensuring that state finances are managed effectively and 
efficiently, the Act requires state owned enterprises to disclose the remuneration and 
benefits of their executive management teams in all their annual reports. 
3.4.4 JSE Listings Requirements 
The JSE Listings Requirements are a set rules and procedures which are aimed at governing 
new applications, all corporate actions and continuing obligations applicable to issuers and 
issuers of specialist securities171 for the purpose of ensuring an orderly place for trading in 
                                                  
168 J La Grange ‘Directors’ remuneration and the concomitant tax issues’ (2012) Taxtalk 20 at 20. 
169 Collier op cit (n157) 136. 
170 Public Finance Management Act at 1 and section 2. 
171Johannesburg Stock Exchange JSE Listings Requirements, available at 
https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSESpecificationsItems/Service%20Issue%2017.pdf, accessed on 15 
September 2014 at 1. 
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securities and to regulate the market. They are furthermore aimed at ensuring that the 
business of the JSE is carried out with due regard to the public interest.172 The listings 
requirements are applicable to all entities listed on the JSE and for such entities compliance 
with the King III is mandatory.173 This means that companies that are listed on the JSE 
have to comply with the recommendations under King III and disclose their compliance 
therewith in their annual reports, failing which will result in fine charges by the JSE.174 
Companies that are not listed on the other hand are subject only to the ‘apply or explain’ 
recommendation under King III.175 
In addition to companies complying with the King III requirements relating to 
disclosure of director remuneration, the JSE Listings Requirements also require listed 
companies to disclose in the annual report and annual financial statements the individual 
director’s remuneration and benefits, including those of any director who has resigned 
during the reporting period.176 The remuneration and benefits which are to be disclosed 
include: fees for services as a director, basic salary, bonuses and performance-related 
payments, sums paid by way of expense allowance, any other material benefits received 
(with an explanation as to what this includes), contributions paid under any pension 
scheme, any commission, gain or profit-sharing arrangements, and share options or any 
other right given.177 In addition, the listings requirements provide that the above-mentioned 
declaration of earnings of each director be also required in respect of all earnings from a 
holding company, subsidiaries, associates of holding or subsidiary companies, joint 
ventures of the group, and any entities that provide management or advisory services to the 
company.178 
Furthermore, all shareholding by directors is expected to be disclosed179 and 
companies are required to keep a policy in place in terms of which dealings in its shares is 
                                                  
172 Ibid. 
173 Naidoo op cit (n47) 36. 
174 Listings Requirement 1.20 (c). 
175 Massie op cit (n2) 86. 
176 Listings Requirement 8.63 (k). 
177 Ibid at 8.63 (k) (i)-(x). 
178 Ibid at 8.63(xi). 
179 Listings Requirement 3.83. 
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regulated.180 Directors are prohibited from trading in company securities without first 
obtaining clearance in accordance with such policy.181 
The listings requirements further require the appointment of a remuneration 
committee for listed companies, whose membership and number of meetings held must be 
disclosed in the annual report.182 
In terms of the listings requirements directors are held liable both in their capacity as 
directors and personally for not applying the listings requirements.183 This means that if a 
director fails to apply any of the requirements, including those relating to remuneration, 
such director will be in breach of the listings requirements and liable to any of the 
prescribed penalties.184 The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the directors 
discharge their obligations in a responsible manner and to hold them accountable for their 
actions and in this case their lack thereof. Despite the existence of this requirement there is 
a great possibility that some of the prescribed penalties, for example fines, may not be 
effective in achieving the above-mentioned purpose because directors could easily pay 
them off as they have more than enough money to pay.  
3.8 Conclusion 
From the discussion above it can be seen that the various regulatory frameworks governing 
director remuneration in South Africa, that is the King III recommendations, the 
Companies Act 2008 and the JSE Listings Requirements, are in unison with respect to the 
disclosure requirements. This is because they all require executive’s remuneration and 
benefits to be disclosed in the annual financial statements. Although the Act makes no 
specific reference to the remuneration policy, King III requires its preparation and 
disclosure in the integrated report. With respect to shareholder approval the regulatory 
frameworks take different approaches. Whilst King III requires the remuneration policy to 
be put to a shareholder non-binding vote at the AGM before it is implemented, the payment 
of remuneration in the Act is subject to the conditions contained in s 66 (8) and (9). 
                                                  
180 Listings Requirement 3.66. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Listings Requirement 3.34(d). 
183 Listings Requirement 3.62. 
184 See para 1.20(a)-(f) of the JSE Listings Requirements. Penalties include a private censure of the 
company or the directors, a fine not exceeding R500 000 as well as the disqualification of directors 
from holding the office of a director. 
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Meaning that the payment of remuneration to directors is provided only if the 
Memorandum of Incorporation provides for it and where a special resolution of 
shareholders passed within the previous two years provides for the payment of such 
remuneration to directors for their service as directors. The JSE Listings Requirements are 
silent on this requirement. With respect to the remuneration committee, though there is no 
specific obligation requiring its appointment in the Companies Act 2008, King III and the 
JSE Listings Requirements require its appointment for purposes of drafting remuneration 
policies, considering issues relating to director pay and to advise the board on remuneration 
issues. King III and the JSE Listings Requirements go a step further by requiring companies 
to disclose the membership of the remuneration committee in the annual integrated report. 
The Companies Act 2008 and the JSE Listings Requirements also contain vital 
requirements which impose personal liability on directors where there are infringements of 
certain provisions. This is important because it ensures that directors perform their 
responsibilities and are held accountable for their actions.  
Despite King III containing a number of important principles and recommendations 
regarding executive remuneration it is however not binding except in respect of listed 
companies which are obliged to comply because the JSE Listings Requirements include 
compliance with King III. Companies that are not listed are not obliged to comply with 
King III as it is principle-based.   
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CHAPTER 4 REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND AUSTRALIA 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter One it was mentioned that the regulation of executive remuneration is not a new 
phenomenon peculiar to South Africa only. Concerns over excessive executive 
remuneration have been one of the underlying international governance issues since the 
occurrence of the corporate scandals and the 2008 financial crisis.185 In response to these 
global scandals, a number of jurisdictions have undertaken various regulatory responses as 
a means of regulating pay practices. These have included adopting strategies aimed at 
linking pay to performance, making shareholder say on pay votes binding, introducing 
more stringent disclosure requirements as well as adopting practices and principles aimed 
at making the remuneration committee more independent and enhancing their role. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine how executive remuneration is regulated in the 
United Kingdom and Australia and to compare them with the South African regulatory 
practices. The underlying objective of the comparative analysis is to compare and contrast 
South Africa’s corporate governance standards regarding remuneration with the United 
Kingdom and Australia with a view of assessing whether South Africa’s remuneration 
practices are in line with international best practices. This chapter will undertake the 
comparative analysis by specifically focusing on the United Kingdom Companies Act 2006 
and the UK Corporate Governance Code and then compare them with the South African 
position. Following this the chapter will then look at the position in Australia and it will 
focus on the Corporations Act 2001, including the amendments to the Corporations Act 
2001 found in the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & Corporate 
Disclosure) Act 2004 also called CLERP 9 Act of 2004, and the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) listing rules and corporate governance principles. Lastly, a comparison is made 
between the Australian manner of regulation and the South African. 
 
 
                                                  
185 See Hill op cit (n1) 64 and De Jongh op cit (n9) 368. 
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4.2 United Kingdom  
4.2.1 Background 
Executive remuneration was not much of a concern in the United Kingdom until the late 
1980s when corporations like Polly Peck International, Maxwell and the Bank of Credit 
and Commerce collapsed and executive remuneration became more of a salient issue in the 
corporate governance debate.186 The collapse of these companies brought awareness to the 
fact that some CEOs, whom at the time served as both CEO and board chairman, were 
excessively paying themselves particularly when the companies were not performing 
well.187 
The corporate scandals led to a process whereby the United Kingdom embarked on 
a journey aimed at addressing the various governance issues, including executive 
remuneration, through the release of various governance Reports. The Report which mainly 
focused on executive remuneration in the United Kingdom was the Greenbury Report 
1995188 and its release was prompted by the growing shareholder and public concerns over 
excessive executive pay and more specifically over ‘gains from share options in the 
recently privatized utility industries [which] sometimes coincided with staff reductions, 
pay restraint for the officers and pay increases.’189 The recommendations provided in the 
Report primarily focused on the establishment, role and function of the remuneration 
committee for listed companies. Additionally, it made recommendations regarding the 
disclosure of executive remuneration and the remuneration policy to be adopted by listed 
companies. It also recommended that shareholders be invited to approve all long-term 
incentive schemes available to directors and executives. However, it provided that only 
under exceptional circumstances should the remuneration committee’s annual report be 
placed on the agenda of annual shareholder meeting. Additionally, the Greenbury 
recommendations dealt with service contracts and the entitlements directors would have in 
the event of early termination.  
                                                  
186 SL Suarez ‘Reciprocal Policy Diffusion: The Regulation of Executive Compensation in the UK 
and US’ (2012) 12 JPA 303 at 307. 
187 Ibid. 
188 JJ du Plessis op cit (n41) 304. 
189 Greenbury Report 1995 Introduction, available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/greenbury.pdf, accessed 11 October 2014 at para 1.6. 
 39 
 
Subsequent reports were released after the Greenbury Report190 and they mainly 
focused on other governance issues as opposed to executive remuneration.  All the reports 
released were later consolidated into one report called the UK Combined Code191 which 
was revised after the financial crisis and renamed to the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(‘UKCGC’). The latest version of the code was published in September 2014. The UKCGC 
applies to all companies having premium listing of equity shares on the London Stock 
Exchange on a ‘comply or explain’ bases.192 It has 18 main principles dealing with various 
areas of governance, remuneration being dealt with at section D. 
4.2.2 UK Corporate Governance Code 
In terms of the UKCGC, the underlying principle with respect to remuneration is that it 
should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of a suitable quality and at the 
same time it should be structured in such a way that it is linked to company and individual 
performance.193 Under the Code the board is given the responsibility of establishing the 
remuneration committee194 and delegating the responsibility of setting the remuneration 
for all executive directors.195 The remuneration committee should comprise of at least three 
independent non-executive directors and in the case of small companies two independent 
non-executive directors.196 The chairman of the board may be a member of the committee, 
though cannot be a chair of the committee, provided he or she is independent at the time of 
appointment.197 Additionally, the UKCGC recommends that the remuneration committee 
appoint remuneration consultants,198 provided the identity of the remuneration consultants 
is disclosed in the annual report and a statement is made as to whether they have any other 
connection with the company.199 The purpose of appointing remuneration consultants is to 
                                                  
190 Hampel Report (1998) was a consolidation of the Cadbury and Greenbury Report. Tunbull Report 
(1999) provided guidance to directors on the internal finances and audit controls seen as necessary to 
manage risk in organisations. Higgs Report (2003) primary focus was on the role and effectiveness of 
non-executive directors. See generally du Plessis op cit (n40) 301-306. 
191 Du Plessis op cit (n41) 306. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code, Section D: Remuneration, 
September 2014, available at https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-
Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-2014.pdf, accessed on 10 October 2014.  
194 Principle D.2.1 UK Corporate Governance Code. 
195 Principle D.2.2 UK Corporate Governance Code. 
196 Principle D.2.1 UK Corporate Governance Code. 
197 Principle D.2.1 UK Corporate Governance Code. 
198 Principle D.2 UK Corporate Governance Code. 
199 Principle D.2.1 UK Corporate Governance Code. 
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ensure that their recommendations are free from bias and they provide independent 
judgement on the remuneration of executives.  
In setting the remuneration of executives, the remuneration committee should ensure 
that the remuneration is designed in such a way that it promotes the long-term success of 
the company.200 As a way of ensuring that the design of performance related remuneration 
of executive directors is transparent and rigorously applied, Schedule A of the UKCGC201 
sets out guidelines for the remuneration committee. Schedule A recommends the 
remuneration committee to determine an appropriate balance between fixed and 
performance related remuneration.202 With respect to share based remuneration, the 
remuneration committee should require directors to hold a minimum number of shares and 
to hold shares for a further period after leaving the company, subject to the need to finance 
any costs of acquisition and associated tax liabilities. Furthermore, shares and other 
incentives should not vest for at least three years.203 
The Code further requires the remuneration committee to avoid rewarding poor 
performance when making termination payments to directors.204 It recommends that the 
remuneration committee carefully consider what compensation commitments director’s 
terms of appointment would entail in the event of early termination.205 The remuneration 
committee should also ensure that notice and contract periods are set at one year or less.206 
Lastly the Code recommends that shareholder approval be obtained for all new long-term 
incentives and any significant changes to existing schemes.207  
The UKCGC recommends the remuneration committee to judge the remuneration 
policies of the company with that of other companies, however doing so cautiously in order 
to avoid paying excessively.208 The Code recommends this in recognition of the effects of 
                                                  
200 Principle D.1 UK Corporate Governance Code. 
201 See UK Corporate Governance Code Schedule A: The design of performance-related 
remuneration for executive directors at 24. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Principle D.1.4 UK Corporate Governance Code. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Principle D.1.5 UK Corporate Governance Code. 
207 Principle D.2.4 UK Corporate Governance Code. 
208 Principle D.1 UK Corporate Governance Code. 
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reporting and disclosing executive remuneration, which has in the past led to an upward 
ratchet of remuneration levels.209 
4.2.3 Companies Act 2006 
In 2013 the United Kingdom government introduced the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Act 2013 which amended certain provisions of the Companies Act 2006 relating to 
directors remuneration for quoted companies. The key changes came into effect on 1 April 
2014 and essentially require every United Kingdom quoted company,210  to produce a 
detailed directors’ remuneration report for each financial year that includes the company’s 
policy on directors’ remuneration and an explanation of how it was implemented during 
the year.211 The Act makes it an offence not to do so.212 The rules on the detailed contents 
of the report and how remuneration is to be calculated are prescribed in the Large and 
Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendments) Regulations 
2013 no. 1981. 
In terms of the regulations, the remuneration reports are split into two sections. One 
section, called the remuneration policy report, is forward looking because it sets out the 
company’s policy on remuneration for future financial years, it also explains the company’s 
plans to pay directors and how the approach taken is consistent with the company’s long 
term performance.213 This section of the report is subject to a binding shareholder vote at 
least every three years. The second section of the report, called the annual implementation 
report, is backward looking as it contains details of directors pay, as per the implemented 
pay policy, for the year that is being reported on and it also details how the policy will be 
implemented in the next financial year. This section of the report is subject to an annual 
shareholder advisory vote which is made through an ordinary resolution.214 The purpose of 
the advisory vote is to give shareholders a formal opportunity to indicate whether they 
support the disclosed executive’s pay and although it’s not binding upon the board, the 
                                                  
209 Ibid. 
210 Section 420 (1) Companies Act 2006. 
211 Massie op cit (n2) 96. 
212 Section 420 (2) and (3) Companies Act 2006. 
213 See Department for Business, Innovation & Skills ‘Directors’ pay: Consultation on the revised 
reporting regulations’, June 2012, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31652/12-888-
directors-pay-consultation-remuneration-reporting.pdf, accessed 12 October 2014. 
214 Ibid. 
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board will take the results of the vote into account, as appropriate, when considering future 
compensation policies, procedures and decisions. 
The remuneration policy report encourages companies to take a holistic approach to 
remuneration by requiring companies disclose in the report the following:215 
 The remuneration policy for all directors which has to be done in a table 
form, setting out each element of the pay package and how it works, 
including how the pay policy supports the company’s strategy and 
objectives.216 
 A bar chart that indicates the minimum remuneration that could be paid to a 
director, the amount that would be paid if the director meets company 
expectations with respect to performance targets and the maximum amount 
of remuneration receivable.217 
 The policy must summarise and explain the loss of office payment policy, 
including notice periods, calculation of termination payments as well as an 
explanation of how the director’s performance during his office will affect 
his termination payment.218 
 Information on how the pay and employment conditions of other employees 
were taken into account in setting directors’ remuneration.219 
 Information on whether employees were consulted on the policy.220 
 Information on how shareholder views were taken into consideration.221 
The annual implementation report, on the other hand, will contain details of the 
following information: 
 A single figure for the total pay for each director, and the figure for the 
preceding financial year.222  
                                                  
215 Massie op cit (n2) 98. 
216 Regulation 25 and 26 Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
(Amendments) Regulations 2013 no. 1981. 
217 Ibid Regulation 34 (1) (a)-(c). 
218 Regulation 36-37.  
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220 Regulation 39. 
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 Payments to past directors, but not payments below a de minimus threshold 
set by the company, payments previously disclosed, payment for services 
provided or termination, pensions, or dividends on incentive awards.223 
 Full details of payments for loss of office.224 
 An explanation of how executive pay compares to other costs such as tax, 
dividends, share buy backs and retained profits. 
 Percentage increase in the chief executive officer’s (CEO) pay relative to 
employees’ total remuneration since previous financial year.225  
 Details of directors’ shareholding requirements.226 
 A statement describing how the company intends to implement the 
approved directors’ remuneration policy in the financial year following the 
relevant financial year.227 
 Details of the remuneration committee including the name of each director 
who was a member of the committee at any time when the committee was 
considering any director remuneration matter.228 
 How shareholders have voted on both sections of the remuneration report 
in the previous financial year, including number of abstentions, reasons for 
shareholder dissent if known and any resulting action which the 
remuneration committee has taken.229  
As mentioned earlier, the director’s remuneration policy must be put to a binding 
shareholders vote once every three years,230 whereas the annual implementation report will 
be put to a shareholders annual advisory vote.231 In terms of the Companies Act 2006, if 
there are any changes to the remuneration policy they must be approved by the shareholders 
first before they can take effect. 
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In the event that the remuneration policy fails two options are available: (1) the 
company can continue to operate in accordance with the most recent policy that has passed 
shareholder approval;232 or (2) the company can call a general meeting to put the new or 
amended remuneration policy to another shareholder vote.233 
In terms of the Act, directors who know, or are reckless as to whether, a statement in 
the remuneration report is untrue or misleading or know an omission is a dishonest 
concealment of a material fact, will be liable to compensate the company for any loss 
suffered by it as a result. In addition, directors are liable to fines for failure to prepare the 
report, provide information for the report, sign the report, give notice to shareholders of the 
vote on the report or put the report to a vote.234 Furthermore, if an unlawful payment is 
made, it is held by the recipient and the directors can bring an action to recover it.235 If the 
shareholders are unable to recover the payment, the directors who authorised the payment 
can be held liable.236 
4.3 Comparison with South African Regulation  
There are a number of similarities that exist between South Africa’s manner of regulating 
executive pay and that of the United Kingdom. These similarities tend to relate more to the 
general corporate governance principles and can be summed up as follows; 
 Both countries require remuneration levels to be sufficient enough to attract, 
retain and motivate individuals of a suitable calibre whilst at the same time 
taking into consideration the interests of the company and stakeholders by 
linking pay to the company long term strategy and performance. 
 Both countries recommend the establishment of remuneration committees for 
purposes of determining the remuneration policy of executives. The said 
committee must comprise of mainly independent non-executive directors and the 
chair of the board may be a member of the committee but not the chair of the 
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committee.237 In setting the remuneration, the remuneration committee should 
ensure there is an appropriate balance between the fixed and variable elements.  
 Failure to comply with either country’s statutory requirements will result in a 
director being held personally liable for infringement.238 
Despite the existence of the above similarities there are a number of differences that 
can be identified between the United Kingdom’s and South Africa’s manner of regulating 
of executive pay. Firstly, the United Kingdom’s disclosure requirements are more detailed 
in comparison to South Africa’s and this is mainly due to the split of the remuneration 
report into two sections, that is the remuneration report policy and the annual 
implementation report, in the United Kingdom regulations.239 Whilst South Africa requires 
full disclosure of the total earnings of directors in the remuneration report as well as an 
explanation of the remuneration policy, and how it was implemented throughout the 
year,240 the United Kingdom provides detailed descriptions of the information that must be 
contained in the split reports. The United Kingdom also provides more detailed 
requirements of how particular components of remuneration should be calculated, what 
must be included in the calculation for total remuneration in order to allow comparison 
across companies and prescribes how remuneration is to be disclosed graphically in bar 
graphs and tables.241 Furthermore, the United Kingdom requires companies to report on the 
considerations the company took into account when drafting the remuneration policy, for 
example, any shareholder or employee interests.242 South Africa does not require the same 
requirements.  Another noteworthy difference is that whilst United Kingdom companies 
are legally bound to disclose the remuneration policy South African companies do it on 
recommendation or an ‘apply or explain’ basis. 
In an effort to enhance independent judgment and avoiding executive director 
conflict of interest when it comes to the setting of remuneration, the UKCGC recommends 
that the remuneration committee be responsible for appointing outside remuneration 
                                                  
237 Principle D.1 UK Corporate Governance Code and Principle 2.23 para 131 King III. 
238 Section 463 Companies Act 2006 and Section 77(3) (d) (i) of the Companies Act 2008. 
239 Massie op cit (n2) 99. 
240 See Principle 2.26 King III and section 30 (4)-(6) Companies Act 2008. 
241 Massie op cit (n2) 99. 
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consultants. Furthermore, the remuneration committee must disclose in the remuneration 
report whether any consultants were used, who appointed the consultants, how much they 
were paid and how the committee ensured that the advice of the consultant was independent 
and objective.243 The South African King III Code and Companies Act of 2008 do not 
provide much information on the use of remuneration consultants, save for the fact that 
King III allows external advisers to be present at the committees meetings provided that 
this is done by invitation and they do not vote at the committee meeting.244 Furthermore, 
King III recommends board committees to take independent professional advice provided 
it is within the scope of the committee’s terms of reference.245 
Additionally, the United Kingdom through the regulations require the legal 
appointment of the remuneration committee and this can be seen in regulation 22 which 
requires the annual implementation report to provide details about members of the 
committee. The South African Companies Act of 2008 imposes no statutory obligation for 
the establishment of the remuneration committee. 
In terms of shareholder say on pay, South Africa requires a non-binding advisory 
shareholder vote before the policy may be implemented.246 Additionally, South African 
shareholders do not have an adequate say on pay voice due to the lack of clarity in the use 
of the words ‘service as directors’ in s 66(8) of the Companies Act 2008.247 The effect of 
the lack of clarity is that if the words ‘service as directors’ is narrowly interpreted it means 
that shareholders would only have a say on the amounts paid to persons acting as directors 
and would not have any input over the remuneration packages of executive directors in 
their capacity as employees of the company.248 
The position in United Kingdom is different because the regulations require a binding 
vote for the director’s remuneration policy once every three years as well as an annual 
advisory vote for the implementation report. 
 
 
                                                  
243 Regulation 22 (1) (b) and (c). 
244 Paragraph 132 at 46 King III. 
245 Principle 2.23 para 138 King III. 
246 King III Principle 2.27. 
247 Companies Act 2008. 
248 Luiz op cit (n15) 293. 
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4.4 Australia 
4.4.1 Background 
Excessive executive remuneration became a central issue in the corporate governance 
debate in Australia after the collapse of large corporations like One.Tel in 2001 and HIH 
Insurance in 2003.249 Despite the firms operating in different sectors of the economy250 
both companies had a number of similar corporate deficiencies that contributed to their 
eventual downfall. For example, in terms of the executive remuneration practices both 
companies engaged in excessive pay practices particularly at a time when the companies 
were performing poorly.251 For instance, the co-founders of One.Tel, Jodee Rich and Brad 
Keeling, each received A$ 560,000 in salary and an astounding A$ 6.9 million in bonuses 
a few months before the company became insolvent and at HIH the company founder, 
Raymond Williams, received a salary increment of 44 per cent from A$ 775,000 to A$ 1.2 
million from early 1997 to March 1999, a period when the financial strength of the 
company was fading.252 
Following the collapse of HIH Insurance, the HIH Royal Commission was set up, at 
the instance of the Australian law makers, to investigate the company and the reasons for 
its downfall.253 This consequently led to a series of governance-related recommendations 
to Australian legislature, regulators, and the ASX and as a result of these recommendations, 
two significant developments arose.254 Firstly, there was the release of the Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program Act (‘CLERP 9’) of 2004, which introduced s 300A to the 
Corporations Act 2001. Secondly, there was the release of the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council's Principles of Good Corporate Governance Practice and Best Practice 
Recommendations (‘ASX Corporate Governance Principles’) in 2003.255  Both the CLERP 
9 Act and the ASX Corporate Governance Principles contain substantial guidance on 
executive remuneration. Whilst some of the guidance in the CLERP 9 Act is mandatory 
                                                  
249 Hill op cit (n1) 65. 
250 One. Tel was a telecommunications company whilst HIH was an insurance company. 
251 JL Barney ‘Corporate Scandals, Executive Compensation, and International Corporate 
Governance Convergence: a U.S.-Australia Case Study’ (2009) 23 Temp Int'l & Comp L J 231 at 
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and contains provisions which have enhanced the remuneration disclosure requirements 
under s 300A of the Corporation Act, the guidance promulgated by the ASX corporate 
governance principles is on a ‘comply or explain’ basis and advocates for companies to 
remunerate executives fairly and responsibly.256  
Essentially there are two main sources regulating executive pay in Australia which 
are the Corporations Act 2001, with the necessary amendments found in CLERP 9 and the 
ASX listing rules and corporate governance principles.  
4.4.2 Corporations Act 2001 
The Corporations Act 2001 stipulates that directors be paid remuneration that the company 
determines by resolution257 although it can be altered by a provision in the constitution.258 
The company’s board is expected to disclose the said remuneration paid to directors.259 
Australia is considered to have one of the most extensive disclosure requirements in the 
world with respect to director’s remuneration which are mainly provided for under s 300A 
of the Corporations Act 2001.260 In terms of the Act companies are required to disclose 
each of the director’s remuneration if it is requested to do so by either 100 members who 
are entitled to vote at a general meeting of the company or by members with at least 5 per 
cent of the votes.261 The remuneration of the directors will be disclosed in the company’s 
annual directors’ report262 which must include, inter alia, specific information required 
under s 300 including disclosures regarding dividends and distributions, information on the 
identity of directors and on options granted and exercised. Additionally, the directors’ 
report must contain an annual remuneration report which must appear as a separate section 
of the directors’ report and be headed ‘Remuneration Report’.263 The remuneration report 
essentially contains certain information relating to the remuneration of key management 
personnel who have authority or responsibility for planning and controlling the company’s 
activities. The following must be disclosed in the remuneration report: 
                                                  
256 Ibid. 
257 Section 202A Corporations Act 2001. 
258 Section 135 Corporations Act 2001. 
259 Section 202A and 202B (1) Corporations Act 2001. 
260 JJ du Plessis et al Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance 2ed (2011) 128. 
261 Section 202B (1) Corporations Act 2001. 
262 Section 292 Corporations Act 2001. 
263 Luiz op cit (n15) 270. 
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 an explanation of the board’s policy on executive remuneration;264 
 a discussion of the relationship between the policy and  the performance by 
the company;265 
 details of remuneration of key management personnel such as directors and 
members of management;266 
 the reasons for failing to subject to performance conditions any 
remuneration made through shares or options;267 
 the relative proportion of remuneration related to performance, value of 
options granted and aggregate and percentage values of remuneration 
through options;268 
 the duration of any executive employment contract, periods of notice and 
termination payments;269 and 
 whether remuneration consultants were used, what kind of advice they 
provided to the company as well as the amount and nature of consideration 
paid to them.270 
Failure to disclose directors remuneration as required by s 202B (1) results in an 
offence of strict liability.271 
In addition to the disclosure requirements the Act also imposes an obligation on listed 
companies to put the remuneration report to a shareholders advisory vote at the AGM.272 
The advisory vote in Australia has far reaching consequences should there be a significant 
number of shareholders who vote against the adoption of the report. If the remuneration 
report receives a 25 per cent vote or more against its adoption at the AGM, the report is 
given a ‘first-strike’,273 whereupon the board is given the opportunity to address the 
shareholders concerns about executive remuneration and explain in the next years’ report 
                                                  
264 Section 300A (1) (a) Corporations Act 2001. 
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what it did to respond to the negative vote or why it failed to respond.274 Should the 
remuneration report receive a 25 per cent vote or more against its adoption at the 
subsequent AGM , that is the second consecutive (later) AGM, it receives ‘second strike’275 
and thus prompting a spill resolution276 by shareholders at the same AGM.277 The purpose 
of the spill resolution is for the shareholders to decide whether a general meeting, called a 
spill meeting, will be convened within 90 days from the passed spill resolution with the 
agenda of resolving that all the persons who were company directors at the AGM cease to 
hold office immediately before the end of the said spill meeting.278   However, managing 
directors or directors who are entitled to remain in office indefinitely without being re-
elected are excluded from the directors who would be required to step down.279 
Furthermore, the spill resolution is intended to give the shareholders the opportunity to put 
to a vote people who will be appointed to the positions that will be vacant at the end of the 
spill meeting.280 
4.4.3 ASX listing rules and Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
In terms of the ASX listing rules, the rule which directly deals with the regulation of 
executive remuneration is Rule 10.17, which requires shareholder approval for any increase 
in the total amount of director’s fees, and that an executive's salary or a director's fees must 
not be tied to the company's operating revenue.281 Rule 3.1 contains a disclosure obligation 
essentially requiring listed companies to notify the ASX once they become aware of any 
information concerning it that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect 
on the price or value of its securities. Rule 4.10.3 requires each listed company to include 
a ‘statement disclosing the extent to which the entity has followed the best practice 
recommendation set by the ASX Corporate Governance Council’ in its annual report. 
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Violations of the ASX Listing Rules can result in suspension of the quotation of a 
company's securities282 or even removal from the ASX.283  
The ASX corporate governance principles contain more detailed and relevant 
requirements related to executive remuneration. The underlying principle with respect to 
the regulation of executive remuneration under the ASX corporate governance principles 
is contained under Principle 8 and requires companies to ensure that the level and 
composition of remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that the relationship between 
remuneration and performance is clear.284 In order to ensure that executives are paid 
sufficiently and are not rewarded for poor performance, the ASX principles require that 
there must be an appropriate balance between the executives fixed remuneration and 
incentive pay. In doing so companies are expected to take into account the entity’s 
obligations at law and labour market conditions, the entity’s short and long-term 
performance objectives, the entity’s circumstances, goals and risk appetite.285 
In order to ensure that there is an efficient and effective mechanism that guarantees  
transparency, focus and independent judgement on remuneration decisions, boards of listed 
companies are required to have a remuneration committee.286 The committee will comprise 
of at least three members, a majority of whom must be independent directors and must be 
chaired by an independent director.287 Should the board opt not to establish a remuneration 
committee, the board is required to disclose that fact and further disclose the processes it 
employs for setting the level and composition of remuneration for executives ensuring that 
such remuneration is appropriate and not excessive.288 The ASX listing rules make it 
compulsory for listed companies which are included in the S&P/ASX 300 Index289 to have 
a remuneration committee comprised solely of non-executive directors for the entire 
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duration of the financial year.290 Although executive directors can be a part of the 
remuneration committee they cannot be involved in deciding their own remuneration.291 
The remuneration committee is essentially responsible for reviewing and making 
recommendations on executive and senior management remuneration, recruitment, 
retirement, termination and incentive policies, and any incentive schemes.292 Overall the 
remuneration committee ensures that the remuneration practices and policies of the 
company meet the needs of the company and encourage long-term corporate and individual 
performance.293 
The remuneration committee is empowered to acquire the services of remuneration 
consultants however in doing so it must disclose this in the remuneration committees’ 
charter.294 Additionally, if remuneration consultants are used the listed company has to 
ensure it complies with s 206K-206M of the Corporations Act 2001 regarding the 
engagement of remuneration consultants to advice on the remuneration packages to be 
awarded to key management personnel.295 The said sections are essentially aimed at 
regulating the use of remuneration consultants by the board or remuneration committee and 
ensuring that the consultant's recommendations are free from undue executive influence. 
The sections require, for example, prior approval from the board or remuneration 
committee before the consultant’s contract is executed296 and the consultant should also 
ensure that the recommendation is provided directly to the independent or non-executive 
directors instead of the executive director.297 
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4.4 Comparison with South African Regulation 
There are a number of similarities that exist between South Africa’s manner of regulating 
executive pay with that of the Australia and just like the United Kingdom, these similarities 
tend to relate more to the general corporate governance principles. They can be summed 
up as follows: 
 Both countries require remuneration levels to be fair and responsible by 
ensuring that it is sufficient enough to attract, retain and motivate individuals 
of a suitable calibre whilst at the same time taking into consideration the 
interests of the company and shareholders by linking pay to the company long 
term strategy and performance.298 Additionally, executives’ pay should be a 
balance between the fixed and the variable components or performance based 
remuneration of executives.299 
 Both countries require the establishment of remuneration committees which 
must comprise mainly of independent non-executive directors.300 
 Both countries require companies to disclose the remuneration of executive 
directors in the annual remuneration report,301 although Australia’s disclosure 
requirements are much more detailed. 
 Failure to comply with either countries statutory requirements will result in a 
director being held personally liable for any infringement.302  
Despite the existence of the above similarities there are a number of differences that 
can be identified between Australia’s and South Africa’s manner of regulating executive 
pay. As mentioned earlier the disclosure requirements in Australia are more detailed than 
those in South Africa. In addition to the standard disclosure requirements, for example 
disclosures on salaries, benefits and bonuses, Australian public companies are required to 
disclose in the annual remuneration report a discussion of the company’s remuneration 
                                                  
298 See Principle 8 ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations and King III 
Principle 2.25 para 147. 
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policy, the link between the policy and the company’s performance, a summary of any 
performance conditions applicable to remuneration, an explanation of why those conditions 
were chosen and how they were evaluated as being satisfied.303 The report must also 
include information on the company’s earnings and shareholder wealth. Although King III 
does require companies to provide an explanation of the remuneration policy followed 
throughout the company and how such policy was implemented,304 South Africa’s 
disclosure requirements are mainly centred around the disclosure of the rudimentary 
requirements, for example, disclosures on salaries, benefits and bonuses,305 as well as 
disclosures on details such as policy on base pay; participation in share incentives schemes; 
the use of benchmarks; incentive schemes to encourage retention, policies regarding 
executive employment etc.306 Additionally, the remuneration policy and an explanation of 
the link between the policy and the company’s performance are legally required to be 
disclosed in Australia whereas in South Africa they are disclosed on an ‘apply or explain’ 
basis. 
In terms of the remuneration committee, Australia gives the remuneration committee 
statutory backing force by providing a definition of the committee and requiring that 
remuneration consultants be approved by the remuneration committee or the board before 
entering into the remuneration consultancy contract.307 However, there is no similar 
requirement with respect to the South African Companies Act. With respect to the 
executive director’s membership in the remuneration committee, Australia permits 
executive directors to be a part of the remuneration committee though they cannot be 
involved in deciding their own remuneration.308 South African executives may attend by 
invitation meetings which require their input on the reward and employee relations, but 
may not vote and they must also not be present when their remuneration is discussed.309 
                                                  
303 Section 300A (1) Corporations Act 2001. 
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Australia has a number of principles governing the use of remuneration consultants310 as 
well as disclosure requirements relating to the use of the remuneration consultants.311 
Though South Africa allows the use external advisers,312 whose composition must be 
disclosed in the integrated report,313 it does not have the same stringent requirements on 
the use of remuneration consultants like Australia. 
Australia’s approach to shareholders say on pay is quite different to the South African 
approach. Whilst South Africa requires a special resolution approved by the shareholders 
within the previous two years approving the payment of director remuneration314 as well 
as a non-binding advisory vote on the remuneration policy before it is implemented.315 
Australia requires an advisory vote on the remuneration report and has also adopted the 
Two Strike rule. The combination of the advisory vote and the Two Strike rule gives 
shareholders a meaningful voice because they have the opportunity to voice their concerns 
and it also compels the board to take note of these concerns or face removal from the board 
and be re-elected in the event the directors fail to listen to the shareholders for two 
consecutive years.316 The same cannot be said for South Africa for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the advisory vote is not binding therefore even if shareholders disapprove the 
remuneration policy they are not bound by the recommendations of the shareholders. 
Secondly, the lack of clarity in the use of the words ‘service as directors’ in s 66 (8),317 
means that if the section is interpreted narrowly South African shareholders do not have a 
meaningful voice on executive remuneration. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Generally South Africa, the United Kingdom and Australia have a lot in common in terms 
of their executive remuneration practices particularly with respect to the principles aimed 
at linking pay to performance, making the remuneration committee more independent as 
well as some of the disclosure requirements and imposing stiff penalties for defaulting 
directors. However, it must also be pointed out that over the years the United Kingdom and 
Australia have taken steps to amend their company legislation and regulations and have 
introduced more detailed and stringent requirements relating to the disclosure of director’s 
remuneration and shareholder say on pay.  With respect to the disclosure requirements, the 
United Kingdom has gone as far as requiring the disclosure of director remuneration in two 
separate reports to providing detailed requirements of how particular components of the 
remuneration should be calculated. Australia has gone beyond the standard disclosure 
requirements and now requires detailed disclosures such as an explanation of the proportion 
of the elements of the director’s remuneration that are related to performance and those 
that are not.318 
In so far as shareholder say on pay in concerned, it can be said that South Africa is 
still lagging far behind its international counter parts. This is because the United Kingdom 
and Australian legislation have adopted approaches which either requires a binding or 
advisory shareholders vote on director’s remuneration, whilst the South African 
Companies Act 2008 does not require the remuneration report to be put to a vote. At best 
King III recommends the remuneration policy to be put to a non-binding advisory vote 
which is, however, not binding. Furthermore, the lack of clarity on the meaning of ‘service 
as director’ under s 66 (8) makes it difficult for South African shareholders to have a 
meaningful voice on executive pay. 
The following chapter will provide recommendations on how best South Africa can 
improve its current corporate governance practices relating to executive remuneration. 
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CHAPTER 5  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.0 Introduction 
The difficulties arising from the agency problem have certainly been recognised by South 
Africa hence the various instruments that have been put in place to assist in addressing the 
problem. Whilst the country generally maintains a comprehensive set of corporate 
governance related laws and regulations aimed at improving and addressing corporate 
governance issues like excessive executive remuneration, it is however clear from this 
research that there are still a number of gaps and considerable weaknesses in the country’s 
legislative and regulatory frameworks in so far as regulation of executive pay is concerned.  
The main purpose of this last chapter is to propose recommendations towards 
achieving better regulation of executive remuneration in South Africa.  The chapter will do 
so by suggesting recommendations for improvement based on the key gaps and weaknesses 
that were identified in chapters three and four. In summary the recommendations will be 
aimed at achieving better standards of corporate governance in South Africa by focusing 
on improving the quality of information disclosed on executive pay, ensuring that 
remuneration committees are more independent and have a more effective say on pay as 
well as ensuring that shareholders are given a stronger voice when it comes to executive 
pay levels.  
5.1 Summary of Findings and Recommendations  
This research sought to evaluate the legal and regulatory mechanisms in South Africa 
relating to executive remuneration for the purposes of assessing the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms in ensuring that those in control are accountable to the shareholders and do 
not remunerate themselves excessively at the expense of the shareholders. Additionally, 
the research embarked on a comparative analysis with the United Kingdom and Australian 
legal and regulatory mechanisms with a view to assess South Africa’s standing in relation 
to its international counterparts.  
The research revealed that South Africa has hybrid corporate governance framework 
regulating executive pay which comprises of the King III principles and recommendations, 
the mandatory obligations under the Companies Act 2008 and the JSE Listings 
Requirements which are applicable to listed companies. The research further revealed that 
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the regulatory frameworks are essentially centred on three main principles: the appointment 
of remuneration committees, disclosure of remuneration and approval of remuneration by 
shareholders. When compared with its international counterparts, South Africa’s legal and 
regulatory frameworks shared a number of similarities with that of the United Kingdom 
and Australia, however it still lagged behind particularly with respect to its remuneration 
policies and practices relating to the disclosure of director’s remuneration and shareholder 
say on pay. Given that the Companies Act 2008 seeks to encourage transparency and high 
standards of corporate governance amongst enterprises in South Africa due to the 
significant role they play in the social and economic life of South Africans,319 it is very 
important that the areas where South Africa still lags behind are addressed.  
In view of the above, the following is a brief summary of the key findings from the 
research followed by the appropriate recommendations: 
5.1.1 Remuneration Committee and Consultants 
(a) Current Position in South Africa 
King III recommends companies to appointment remuneration committees for purposes of 
setting up and administering the remuneration policy which must be aligned with the 
company strategy and linked to the executive’s contribution to company performance. This 
principle is supported by the listings requirements which also require the appointment of 
remuneration committees for listed companies, whose membership and number of 
meetings held must be disclosed in the annual report. Although this principle and 
recommendation is very important it is however non-binding except in respect of listed 
companies.320 This is problematic because since King III is principle-based it means boards 
could easily explain away their non-compliance with the principles. The problem is further 
heightened by the lack of a provision in the Companies Act 2008 requiring the appointment 
of remuneration committees.  
With respect to the use of remuneration consultants, South Africa does not strictly 
regulate the use of remuneration consultants by remuneration committees. This poses a 
problem because whilst King III permits the use of remuneration consultants and requires 
                                                  
319 Section 7 (b) (iii) Companies Act 2008 
320 This is only the case because the JSE listing requirements include compliance with King III but 
companies that are not listed do not have to comply with King at all. 
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their composition to be disclosed in the integrated report, this principle is however provided 
for on ‘apply or explain’ basis which means that the board can easily explain away why 
they did not disclose the identity or composition of the remuneration consultants. 
(b) Current Position in the United Kingdom and Australia  
The United Kingdom and Australia both legally require the appointment of remuneration 
committees in their respective company law statutes. Both the United Kingdom and 
Australia require comprehensive disclosure where remuneration consultants are used, for 
example, the remuneration committee is to disclose whether it used any consultants, the 
consideration paid to the consultants and how the committee ensured that the 
recommendations from the consultants was independent and free from bias. 
 Recommendations to Improve the Remuneration Committee and Use of 
Remuneration Consultants in South Africa 
South Africa should adopt the approach followed both in the United Kingdom and 
Australia whereby the appointment of the remuneration committee is legally required. By 
not having such an approach and relying solely on the principles provided in King III 
companies will use this as an opportunity to explain away why they don’t have 
remuneration committees thus leading to executives deciding their own remuneration. 
Having a legal provision making the appointment of the remuneration committee 
mandatory will ensure that the above discussed conflict of interest is avoided.  
To further improve the independence of the remuneration committee, it is 
recommended that it be composed of only independent non-executive directors instead of 
it being composed of a majority of independent non-executive directors. Executive 
directors should be strictly prohibited from being members. By requiring only independent 
non-executive directors to be part of the remuneration committee will ensure that any 
decisions taken by them with respect to setting out pay are indeed independent and 
objective. Furthermore, it will minimise any potential influence from the executive 
directors. 
Currently South Africa’s regulation and use of remuneration consultants is not 
comprehensive when compared to the United Kingdom and Australia. To improve this, the 
following is recommended: 
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(1) There should either be a clear ‘apply or explain’ principle or binding 
legal obligation requiring remuneration consultants to be retained by the 
remuneration committee and for the consultants to provide advice 
directly to the committee and not the executive directors.321 This would 
greatly reduce any conflicts of interest and ensure that the consultant’s 
advice is indeed independent and free from bias. 
(2) In addition, to ensure that the advice provided by the consultants is 
independent and free from bias there should be a requirement to disclose 
the identity of the consultants, any relationship that exists between the 
company and the consultant and lastly disclose any steps taken by the 
board to ensure that the advice offered by the consultant is in fact 
independent and free from executive influence.322 
5.1.2 Disclosure of Executive Remuneration 
(a) Current Position in South Africa 
King III recommends the disclosure of executive director’s remuneration policy and its 
explanation in the annual remuneration report. Listed companies are required in the listings 
requirements to disclose the remuneration and benefits of individual directors in the annual 
report. The Companies Act 2008 requires the compulsory disclosure of executive 
remuneration however it does not require the preparation and subsequent disclosure of the 
remuneration policy and its explanation in the annual financial statements. 
(b) Current Position in the United Kingdom and Australia  
The United Kingdom and Australia require much more detailed and stringent requirements 
relating to the disclosure of director’s remuneration when compared with the position in 
South Africa. The United Kingdom, for example, provides guidelines on how particular 
components of remuneration should be calculated and disclosed in certain graphical form 
whilst Australia requires detailed explanations of, for example, the proportion of the 
elements of the director’s remuneration that are related to performance and those that are 
not. Furthermore, the United Kingdom has adopted a standard method of reporting certain 
                                                  
321 Ibid at 114 
322 Ibid  
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aspects of remuneration by providing guidelines on how remuneration should be 
calculated, the categories in which it should be broken down and how each category is to 
be calculated. This is currently not present in South Africa which makes it difficult for 
shareholders to know how much executives earn particularly with respect to incentive 
awards. In the United Kingdom and Australia the remuneration policy and the explanation 
of the link between executive pay and performance is disclosed as a matter of law whereas 
in South Africa it is rather done on recommendation or an ‘apply or explain’ basis.  
 Recommendations to Improve Disclosure  
In light of the country’s hybrid system of governance, South Africa could introduce a 
provision in the Companies Act 2008 which would make it legally binding for the 
remuneration policy and all benefits paid to directors to be disclosed as opposed to having 
it disclosed on recommendation or an ‘apply or explain’ basis. In addition, how the 
remuneration policy is to be implemented and an explanation of the link between pay and 
performance should be required to be disclosed by law in the Companies Act 2008. 
Requiring the legal disclosure of the policy and its explanation will ensure the board is held 
accountable for ensuring that the correct information is disclosed and it will also encourage 
them to explore various ways of linking pay to performance as they would be compelled 
to explain the link to the shareholders. This type of disclosure will also be beneficial to the 
shareholders as they would be given a wider and clearer picture of the packages awarded 
to executives as well as providing them with an explanation as to why the executives earn 
those packages. 
South Africa should also adopt standard methods of reporting on remuneration 
similar to those used in the United Kingdom.323 As mentioned previously the United 
Kingdom has strict guidelines on how remuneration is to be reported, the categories in 
which it should be broken down, how each category is to be calculated and how the 
considerations and interests of the shareholders, unions and employees were taken into 
account when drafting the remuneration policy. If South Africa could adopt this method of 
disclosure, South African companies would be more transparent and accountable as they 
would no longer be able to hide what is being paid to executives. In addition, this standard 
                                                  
323 Massie op cit (n2) 111 
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method of reporting would ensure shareholders and other interested parties are fully aware 
of the earnings of executives particularly with respect to incentive awards. 
It is common knowledge that executive and non-executive directors have the same 
responsibilities in law. In reality however an executive director is a director who has 
separate responsibilities within the company as an executive and employee. In recognition 
of this it is important that the Companies Act 2008 makes a clear distinction between the 
executive and non-executive directors and requires the separate disclosure of remuneration 
of these two types of directors. By doing so shareholders will be given a clearer picture of 
who is earning what, how much they are earning and why they are being paid that amount. 
The separation will also be useful in helping to address the lack of clarity caused by the use 
of words ‘service as directors’ in s 66(8) as it would be made clear if shareholders have a 
say over director pay in their capacity as directors only or in any other capacity. 
5.1.3 Shareholder Say on Pay 
(a) Current Position in South Africa 
King III recommends the remuneration policy to be tabled to the shareholders annually for 
a non-binding advisory vote at the annual general meeting before it is implemented. The 
Companies Act 2008 makes the payment of executive remuneration subject to the 
Memorandum of Incorporation and shareholders special resolution approved within the 
previous two years. The main difficulty that arises with respect to shareholders say on 
executive pay in the Companies Act 2008  is based on the lack of clarity over the use of 
words ‘service as directors’ in s 66(8) which when narrowly interpreted results in 
shareholders having a limited say on the amounts paid to the executives. 
(b) Current Position in the United Kingdom and Australia 
The United Kingdom and Australia legislation have made their shareholder say on pay vote 
binding to a certain extent which means that their shareholders have a stronger voice when 
it comes to executive pay. South African shareholders do not have the same opportunity as 
their vote is a non-binding advisory vote provided on an ‘apply or explain’ basis in King 
III. 
 Recommendation to Improve Shareholder Say on Pay 
South Africa can strengthen shareholders say on pay by enacting a provision in the 
Companies Act 2008 that would make shareholders legally bound to vote on the 
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remuneration policy, its explanation and certain aspects of the remuneration and benefits 
paid to directors, for example incentive awards, on an annual basis. A mandatory vote 
would ensure that the board is bound by the policy and remuneration approved by the 
shareholders and are also held personally liable for contravening the said policy.324 This 
would therefore be an improvement from the current position whereby the remuneration 
policy is subjected to a non-binding advisory vote which is provided for on 
recommendation or an ‘apply or explain’ basis in King III. Alternatively, as a way of 
encouraging investors to take a more active role in approving executive remuneration as 
well as encouraging board and shareholder engagement, South Africa could adopt the 
Australian ‘two strike’ approach. By adopting this approach it would mean that should the 
remuneration report receive a twenty-five per cent (25%) disapproval at two consecutive 
shareholders AGMs, directors will lose their positions on the board in a mandatory spill 
vote by the shareholders. South Africa’s adoption of the ‘two strike’ rule will be beneficial 
to it as it will motivate boards to listen and actively engage with shareholders after receiving 
the first strike which in turn will result in beneficial changes to the remuneration policies 
and practices for purposes of avoiding a second strike.325 Furthermore, the ‘two strike’ rule 
will provide an additional level of accountability for directors and increased transparency 
to shareholders because the board will be bound to pay attention to the shareholders 
concerns and not pay themselves without the approval of the shareholders or otherwise 
they will face re-election. 
5.2 Conclusion 
In conclusion the reforms undertaken in the United Kingdom and Australia with respect to 
the regulation of executive remuneration and the nature of their requirements demonstrate 
that these countries have been able to establish a more articulate and definite manner of 
regulation compared to South Africa. In particular, the United Kingdom and Australia have 
been able to legislate many of their remuneration requirements and have given shareholders 
a much needed voice with respect to the pay of executives. Whilst South Africa has taken 
a number of steps to address excessive remuneration, most of the principles adopted are 
provided for in King III which is not legally binding and many companies can choose to 
                                                  
324 Ibid at 115 
325 Ibid at 116 
 64 
 
explain away their non-compliance. By benchmarking from the United Kingdom and 
Australia, South Africa will be put in a position whereby it is not only in line with its 
international counterparts but it is also able to address the problems arising from excessive 
executive remuneration and better promotes the objects of the Companies Act 2008. 
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